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Creating Regional Environmental Governance
Regimes: Implications of Southeast Asian
Responses to Transboundary Haze Pollution
Roda Mushkat1
Abstract
The willingness and ability of States to enter into genuinely
collaborative arrangements with their counterparts in general, and
regarding cross-border ecological externalities in particular, is an issue
that provokes divergent responses among researchers in the field of
international law. Realists/neo-realists and institutionalists, whether of the
liberal or constructivist persuasion, approach it from fundamentally
different angles and draw inferences that cannot be readily reconciled. The
long and varied experience of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in
confronting the adverse regional consequences of forest burning may
provide insights with respect to the relative importance of the competing
schools of thought in this context, the limitations of these schools of
thought, and possible ways of weaving them together into a coherent whole.
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I. Introduction
The much-vaunted era of globalization has witnessed the
intensification of international cooperation, but not always in forms
intimately associated with this seemingly powerful economic, political, and
1. Professor of International Law, Hopkins-Nanjing Center, Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University and Honorary Professor,
Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. I wish to thank Miron Mushkat for helping me
navigate through social science territory, but I am solely responsible for the views expressed
herein.
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social phenomenon.2 Global collaboration has expanded markedly, as
exemplified by the transformation of the moderately effective General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the reasonably effective
World Trade Organization (WTO).3 However, progress has at times been
uneven, with conflicting forces generating trends and counter-trends whose
consequences cannot be unambiguously interpreted as being consistent with
supranational institution-building on a global scale.
For instance, in the economic domain, where centripetal influences
are typically most pronounced, but centrifugal pressures are never absent,
headway has often been painfully slow, and the path followed has seldom
been linear. The sense of strategic frustration that this has engendered has
prompted countries, particularly in the wake of Doha Round failures,4 to
revert to bilateral accords (free trade agreements/FTAs or preferential trade
agreements/FTAs) as the principal legal instrument for furthering their
mutual interests.5 Efforts to promote regional cooperation/integration have
also gathered momentum, notably in Europe (European Union/EU) and
North America (North American Free Trade Agreement/NAFTA).6 Such
developments may legitimately be portrayed as manifestations of
international collaboration, but they are not necessarily always conducive to
globalization, as broadly conceived.7
The multi-level cooperative arrangements forged, whether
mutually-reinforcing or conflicting in some respects, may be conveniently
portrayed as governance regimes. This term was coined nearly four decades
ago8 when it was invoked to depict collaborative institutional mechanisms
2.
See JOHN D. DANIELS, LEE H. RADEBAUGH & DANIEL P. SULLIVAN,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: ENVIRONMENTS AND OPERATIONS 284 (13th ed. 2011) (describing
how globalization has lead to bilateral integration, regional integration, and global
integration).
3. See id. at 286 (discussing how the WTO “adopted the principles and trade
agreements reached under the auspices of GATT,” which it succeeded).
4. See id. at 286–87 explaining that the Doha Round is the trade-negotiation round of
the WTO that commenced in Doha, Qatar in 2001 “focused on giving a boost to developing
countries on the world scene.” A dispute “over the agricultural subsidies maintained by the
richer nations and the industrial subsidies enforced by developing nations has resulted in a
split between developed nations and developing nations that is still ongoing. Id.
5. See id. at 288 (noting that Brazil and the EU announced a strategic alliance
between them as did South Korea and the United States which highlights “the increasing
willingness of individual countries to circumvent the multilateral system and engage in
bilateral agreements . . . to meet their global trade objectives”).
6. See id. at 316 (noting that the EU has helped abolish barriers to intrazonal trade
and that NAFTA was designed to eliminate tariff barriers).
7. See id. at 316 (“Regional, as opposed to global, economic integration occurs
because of the greater ease of promoting cooperation on a smaller scale.”).
8. See John G. Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and
Trends, 29 INT’L ORG. 557, 570 (1975) (“International regime [is a] set of mutual
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which subsequently became equated with “sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”9
The scholar who was first to refine the concept elaborated that “[p]rinciples
are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude . . . [n]orms are standards of
behavior . . . [r]ules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action . . .
[and] [d]ecision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and
implementing collective choice.”10
Although this carefully-devised and wide-ranging formulation
reflected the emerging consensus among the growing number of researchers
attracted to the notion of a governance regime, misgivings were expressed
about its lack of concreteness and overly extensive scope.11 It was thus
noted that such entities may be flexibly depicted as “everything from a
patterned set of interaction . . . to any form of multilateral coordination,
cooperation, or collaboration . . . to formal machinery.”12 It was
consequently observed that they may occupy “an ontological space
somewhere between the level of formal institutions . . . and systematic
factors.”13 Paradoxically, this elasticity and fuzziness may partly explain
their theoretical attractiveness because it facilitates entry into the analytical
arena by scholars who address the amorphous phenomenon from
fundamentally different perspectives.14
The ideological or normative underpinnings of the concept of a
governance regime have been subjected to equally critical scrutiny.15 It has
been emphatically argued that researchers who embrace the concept display
a bias, explicit or implicit, in favor of conservative inertia. This is
inevitably associated with accommodating and stability-promoting actors,
expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial
commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.”).
9. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)
[hereinafter Krasner, Structural Causes].
10. Id. at 2.
11. ROBERT M. A. CRAWFORD, REGIME THEORY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD:
RETHINKING NEOLIBERAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 55 (1996) (stating that
the term “regime” tends to be used “very loosely” and there is so little precision associated
with the term that it “ranges from an umbrella for all international relations to little more
than a synonym for international organizations”).
12. Id. at 55.
13. Friedrich Kratochwil & John G. Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the
Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT’L ORG. 753, 760 (1986).
14. See Susan Strange, Cave! Hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 9, at 337, 342–43 (stating that due to imprecision of
technology, the meaning of regime is a source of discussion).
15. See CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 84 (discussing how regime is not a neutral
concept and the term itself is “value loaded”).
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and a negative disposition toward anti-status quo and fiercely independent
actors.16 Despite the recourse to scientific reasoning, “[r]egime thinking
may . . . be ideology masquerading as a necessary truth.”17 It often entails
the “rationalization of current policies, [with a built-in propensity] to
enshrine and codify prevailing practices.”18 Order is accorded greater
importance than justice19 and its maintenance is viewed as intrinsically
good in that there is a “tendency to define regimes as benign, genuinely
voluntarist, and legitimate entities—and assume that everyone wants
them—[which] is contestable.”20
Such reservations notwithstanding, the notion of a governance
regime has not receded into the background. The conceptual opaqueness
and the methodological difficulties to which it gives rise, in terms of
meaningful operationalization, may be deemed not to be materially greater
than in many other domains of socio-legal inquiry.21 By the same token,
present-stage academic work on the subject deals with system
change/dynamism, particularly of the structural variety (regime
shift/transformation), rather than merely path dependence/perpetuation of
existing institutional patterns.22 The problem of ideological contamination
is an inescapable one but, again, it is encountered across the socio-legal
landscape and may be alleviated to some extent by acknowledging that it
exists and handling it in a transparent fashion.23
While not without flaws, real or apparent, regime theory has thus
continued to expand, perhaps even flourish, rather than retreat into
16. See CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 84–85 (explaining how international theory has
leaned in the realist direction with a strong “value-bias” towards order).
17. CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 84.
18. CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 84.
19. See CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 85 (stating that regime literature contains a
“value-bias” towards order as opposed to justice).
20. CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 85; See also Strange, supra note 14, at 345 (noting
that the word regime is value-loaded and “takes for granted that what everyone wants is
more and better regimes”); James F. Keeley, Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of
International Regimes, 44 INT’L ORG. 83, 83–84 (1990) (discussing how regime theory has
been linked to a liberal regime analysis and though it’s an attractive perspective, this type of
liberal approach has its problems).
21. See Strange, supra note 14, at 342–43 (noting that the governance regime is a
“wooly” and imprecise concept, and that, like other uncertain terms, it can be more
disorienting than helpful).
22. See MICHAEL HOWLETT, M. RAMESH & ANTHONY PERL, STUDYING PUBLIC POLICY:
POLICY CYCLES AND POLICY SUBSYSTEMS 202 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing change within a
policy regime that results in a fundamental transformation of policy making and changes the
regimes process and ideas as opposed to changes that “involve relatively minor tinkering
with policies and programs already in place”).
23. See Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41
INT’L ORG. 491, 499 (1987) (noting the flaws of different ideological approaches as each
focuses on and addresses specific dimensions of regimes).
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oblivion.24 The literature on the subject is growing and has reached
substantial proportions.25 A significant fraction of the body of available
24. See generally RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2010) (discussing the effectiveness of international environmental
institutions); ORAN R. YOUNG, INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS: EMERGENT PATTERNS IN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2010) (analyzing the developmental
trajectories of international environmental regimes).
25. See generally ORAN R. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES: NATURAL RESOURCES AND
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1982) (focusing on regimes and collective decision-making involving
the use of natural resources); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING
REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989) [hereinafter YOUNG,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION] (discussing international regimes in theory and in practice);
ANDREW HURRELL & BENEDICT KINGSBURY, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT: ACTORS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS (1992) (analyzing environmental
issues and international environmental regimes); POLAR POLITICS: CREATING INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES (Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko eds., 1993) (analyzing five
comparative studies on regime formation dealing with Arctic issues to test hypotheses as to
why regimes form); NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) (Bertram I.
Spector, Gunnar Sjöstedt & I. William Zartman eds., 1994) (explaining the regime-building
negotiations process that occurred at UNCED); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994) (discussing
the negotiation of a global climate regime); REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer eds., 1995) (exploring the concept of
international regimes); INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Mats
Rolén, Helen Sjöberg & U. Svedin eds., 1997) (discussing environmental affairs and
governance); GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL
EXPERIENCE (Oran R. Young ed., 1997) (discussing regimes as governance systems and
international organization and the creation of environmental regimes); THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998) (describing
implementation and review of environmental regimes); ORAN R. YOUNG, CREATING
REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (1998) (discussing the stages
of international regime formation); THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT (Arild Underdal ed., 1998) (examining political devices used in the operation
and formation of international environmental regimes); ANDREAS HASENCLEVER, PETER
MAYER &VOLKER RITTBERGER, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (4th ed. 2001)
(examining three theories of international regimes); JØRGEN WETTESTAD, DESIGNING
EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: THE KEY CONDITIONS (1999) (focusing on the design
and impact of international regimes); ORAN R. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS
(1999) (presenting a comprehensive account and future prediction of the status of regime
theory); THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL
CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS (Oran R. Young ed., 1999) (analyzing
mechanisms of how regimes influence behavior of their members and those associated with
them); GABRIELA KUTTING, ENVIRONMENT, SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (2000) (discussing current
remedies and effectiveness of international agreements in solving environmental problems);
JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: ENVIRONMENTAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
GOVERNANCE (2d ed. 2000) (applying the tools of regime analysis to show how the oceans,
Antarctica, outer space, and the atmosphere are, or fail to be, governed effectively); MARCUS
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writings is devoted to the issues of environmental quality and appropriate
governance mechanisms, primarily international in nature, to combat
ecological degradation.26 As this is an interdisciplinary endeavor, the point
of departure is similar to that relied upon in other broadly similar fields of
socio-legal investigation. Regimes are thus viewed as “social institutions
consisting of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, procedures, and
programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific areas.”27
However, given the amount of studies undertaken and the intensity
of focus, there has been greater inclination than seen elsewhere to enhance
the basic definition. For instance, it has been recently suggested that
“operating procedures” might better capture the realities of governance

FRANDA, GOVERNING THE INTERNET: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME (2001)
(discussing international regimes and internet security); GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES:
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 2001) (examining global policy making
and implementation); EDWARD L. MILES ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS:
CONFRONTING THEORY WITH EVIDENCE (GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORD: STRATEGIES FOR
SUSTAINABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION) (2001) (discussing why certain
international regimes fail and others succeed); ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FIT, INTERPLAY, AND SCALE (GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORD: STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL
INNOVATION) (2002) (discussing international institutions concerned with environmental
sustainability and innovation); REGIME CONSEQUENCES: METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES (Arild Underdal & Oran R. Young eds., 2004) (presenting
studies of regime effectiveness); DENISE K. DEGARMO, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATIES AND STATE BEHAVIOR: FACTORS INFLUENCING COOPERATION (2005) (conducting
an analysis of nation-state behavior in the international environmental realm); PALGRAVE
ADVANCES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (Michelle M. Betsill, Kathryn
Hochestetler & Dimitris Stevis eds., 2005) (discussing current debates in environmental
politics and evaluating international environmental politics and policies); HELMUT
BREITMEIER, THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (2008) (exploring the influence
that regimes have on how states comply with international norms and whether or not
problem-solving in international regimes is effective); INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS (Oran R. Young,
Leslie A. King & Heike Schroeder eds., 2008) (presenting an overview on how institutions
matter in an effort to wrestle environmental problems); KATE O’NEILL, THE ENVIRONMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2009) (discussing important themes and controversies
regarding international relations and the environment); PAMELA S. CHASEK, DAVID L.
DOWNIE & JANET WELSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (5th ed. 2010)
(providing an overview of environmental affairs and international politics, and recent
perspectives on international regimes); MITCHELL, supra note 24 (discussing the
effectiveness of international environmental institutions); YOUNG, supra note 24 (analyzing
the developmental trajectories of international environmental regimes).
26. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
27. Oran R. Young & Marc A. Levy, The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Regimes, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL
CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 1, 1 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999).
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regimes than “decision-making procedures.” 28 This has resulted in the
substitution of the “operating procedures” concept (e.g. “[o]perating
procedures are prevailing practices for work within [a] regime, including
methods for making and implementing collective choice.”) to replace the
“decision-making procedures” concept (“Decision-making procedures are
prevailing methods for making and implementing collective choice.”) 29
More affirmatively, it has been stated that governance regimes are
“institutions that actors create or accept to regulate and coordinate action in
a particular issue area.”30
For the same reasons, scholars’ concerns with systems of
international environmental management tend to decompose the multidimensional definition that underpins research in the field into its
constituent parts (principles, norms, rules, decision-making/operational
procedures, programs, actors’ expectations, interactions, institutions,
regulation, and coordination) and dissect them perhaps further than is
common in this type of socio-legal exploration.31 They also draw a number
of additional distinctions that loom less large on parallel academic agendas,
the one between prevailing orders and regimes being possibly the most
fundamental.32
The former are regarded as “broad, framework arrangements
governing the activities of all (or almost all) the members of international
society over a wide range of specific issues.”33 The latter, on the other hand,
are viewed as “more specialized agreements that pertain to well-defined
activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some
subset of the members of international society.”34 Both categories are
accorded considerable analytical attention but, in the face of burgeoning
symptoms of ecological deterioration and as a result of a pragmatic desire

28. See CHASEK, DOWNIE & BROWN, supra note 25, at 19 (“[The decision-making way
of characterizing regimes] has been strongly criticized for including arrangements that are
merely patterned interactions, operational frameworks, and even methods to agree to
disagree with no long-term predictability or stability.”).
29. CHASEK, DOWNIE & BROWN, supra note 25, at 19.
30. CHASEK, DOWNIE & BROWN, supra note 25, at 19.
31. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 15–18 (identifying
and describing key components that every regime possesses, such as rights, rules, actors, and
procedures).
32. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 13 (“[Dividing] the
category of international institution into two more or less distinct subsets: international order
and international regimes.”).
33. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 13.
34. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 13.
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to maintain a steadfast problem-solving orientation, the focus is
increasingly shifting toward regimes, and away from prevailing orders.35
However, this cannot be portrayed as an entirely balanced process.
Understandably, perhaps, projects are primarily directed toward regulatory
mechanisms, which are not confined to specific segments of the globe, even
if they may otherwise be narrow in scope (i.e., restricted to a single issue).36
With the possible exception of the EU, regional arrangements, particularly
those relatively loose in nature, have not been examined in depth.37 This
makes ASEAN a potentially interesting case from a theoretical perspective.
It is a regional regime, not a young one, but still in the intermediate stages
of its evolution and with an unclear destination.
ASEAN’s institutions and performance, across the policy spectrum
and in particular realms of intergovernmental initiative, have been
described and analyzed carefully and on a meaningful scale.38 Responses to
transboundary haze pollution have not been overlooked. Indeed, a
conceptually rigorous and extensive survey of experiences in this sphere
has been published recently.39 However, building on the available body of
knowledge, there is scope to explore further the functioning of this regional
entity in that specific domain, with a view to drawing additional
conclusions about geographically well-defined, but not organizationally
robust, environmental governance regimes. This is the aim of the present
paper.
II. Overall Institutional Patterns
ASEAN is the most visible manifestation of Asian regionalism,
even though it does not possess the geographical breadth of Asia-Pacific
35. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 13–14 (noting that
ecological and environmental problems such as “conservation of polar bears, the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum, and human activities in Antarctica” are described in terms of
international regimes).
36. See Young & Levy, supra note 27, at 7–8 (discussing an international regime that
addressed problems arising from intentional discharge of oil by tankers).
37. See generally ROUTLEDGE INT’L HANDBOOKS, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: A HANDBOOK (Jens-Uwe Wunderlich & David J. Bailey eds., 2011)
(analyzing the role of the European Union, its function in global politics and its role as a
global actor).
38. See generally ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, EMERGING ASIAN REGIONALISM: A
PARTNERSHIP FOR SHARED PROSPERITY (2008) (discussing Asia’s regionalism and
specifically ASEAN’s framework for regional cooperation); MICHAEL ANTOLIK, ASEAN
AND THE DIPLOMACY OF ACCOMMODATION (1990) (exploring the successes of ASEAN,
compared to other regional associations that have not excelled).
39. See PARUEDEE NGUITRAGOOL, ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA: ASEAN’S REGIME FOR TRANSBOUNDARY HAZE POLLUTION 2 (2011) (discussing
Southeast Asian haze and Indonesia’s land and forest fires).
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Economic Cooperation (APEC) and does not count any world powers
among its core members.40 It is a modestly-sized collaborative scheme
consisting of countries that marginally qualify as middle powers, but it
stands out in terms of the closeness of official inter-State linkages in an area
where national autonomy is highly valued and where there is no strong
desire for regional unification.41 Other similar organizational vehicles, such
as Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), display less
collaborative effectiveness and are not as strategically prominent.42
Asian regionalism is an intricate phenomenon. It entails regional
integration, which in turn leads to greater interdependence.43 The former
may be market-driven or policy-led.44 The latter features interaction via
economic (e.g., finance, investment, and trade) and non-economic (e.g.,
cultural, political, and social) channels.45 It also involves regional
cooperation in the form of official activities that are conducive to regional
integration by virtue of their contribution to cross-border coordination,
planning, and response to problems, which defy unilateral solutions.46 Such
activities include “intergovernmental dialogue, information exchanges,
provision of regional public goods, and regional institution building.”47

40. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 256 (noting that ASEAN’s
membership only includes Asian countries whereas APEC’s membership includes countries
from other continents).
41. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 18–19. “The price of
cooperation is the loss of some national sovereignty and the narrowing of policy options for
pursuing purely national objectives.” Id. “It is understandably difficult for large, successful,
and independent economies to make such compromises, and ultimately to pool some
sovereignty within regional institutions.” Id.
42. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 247, 250. The authors
recognizing that SAARC has “focused principally on cooperation in agriculture, rural
development, and health” while CAREC “promotes shared infrastructure projects and the
improvement of policy environment in prior areas, such as transport, energy, and trade.” Id.
While both of these groups involve Asian members and cooperation, “ASEAN is furthest
along the path towards integration.” Id.
43. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 39 (explaining how
interdependence is deepening because of regional integration, specifically among markets).
44. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 45. The authors discuss how
regional integration is not alone in displaying such an increasing regional bias and how. Id.
“Technology and policy seem to be generating new opportunities for regional integration,
even in the context of a rapidly globalizing world economy.” Id.
45. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 42 (“[The] measure of
interdependence needs to include other important channels such as direct investment,
financial flows, macroeconomic links, and personal contacts.”).
46. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at XII (referring to the definition
of “regional cooperation”).
47. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at XII.
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Given the opportunities and constraints, the dramatic rise in
affluence and the persistence of nationalist sentiment, Asian regionalism
has been characterized by its economic vitality. Regional production
networks have proliferated, intra-regional trade has intensified, regional
financial collaboration in all its shapes has deepened, and macroeconomic
interdependence has become an inescapable reality, necessitating joint
action on an ongoing basis.48 However, these patterns have been amply
observed throughout Asia.49 What has distinguished ASEAN from other
supranational initiatives in broadly the same geographical space is the scope
and degree of regional cooperation.50
Indeed, the process of economic integration and growing economic
interdependence within ASEAN, which is currently the primary focus of
academic and policy attention, had been slow to unfold and has only
recently gained significant momentum.51 Nor can joint security concerns,
another paramount strategic issue, be portrayed as the dominant element in
the ASEAN equation.52 The economic and security underpinnings have
played a pivotal role, but this has been a policy-inspired transformation,
rather than a market-shaped one, involving collaboration on multiple fronts,
beyond what has been witnessed elsewhere in Asia, even if this may not
qualify as a rigorous standard.53
Prior to the establishment of ASEAN, Southeast Asia “was rife
with internal divisions and interference by external powers.”54 Attempts to
reduce fractures and minimize friction by formal institutional means began
as early as the 1950s, with the creation of the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO), and continued in earnest in the 1960s, when
entities such as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and the Asian
Pacific Council (ASPAC), were established.55 For the most part, these
48. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 57–197 (discussing the
economic vitality created by Asian regionalism by detailing the following points: integrating
production, integrating financial markets, and managing macroeconomic interdependence).
49. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 58 (“Asia’s economies are
becoming ever more closely intertwined, particularly through trade and investment.”).
50. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 246–51 (noting that ASEAN is
central to the “architecture of regional cooperation” in Asia as it is furthest along on the path
toward integration).
51. See SHAUN NARINE, EXPLAINING ASEAN: REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1
(2002) (“However, even a cursory examination of ASEAN’s history and institutional
development reveals that meaningful economic interaction has only recently become a
significant part of the organization’s activities.”).
52. See id. at 1 (“ASEAN is clearly not a security alliance.”).
53. See id. at 3–5 (noting that the fundamental functions of ASEAN, i.e. protecting
and enhancing the sovereignty of its member states, have played the largest role in its
success).
54. Id. at 9.
55. See id. at 9–12 (introducing the origins of the ASEAN organization).
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strategic efforts encountered insurmountable obstacles and quickly fizzled
out, with SEATO proving perhaps the exception to the norm in terms of its
ability to evolve into a complex structure and endure.56
ASEAN was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, and the Philippines as a potential conflict-containment and
stability-enhancing institutional mechanism against the backdrop of
persistent escalation in political and territorial disputes in the region.57 It
also sought to minimize Southeast Asia’s dependence on external powers,
particularly in the military domain, and stifle full-blown and incipient
communist insurgencies through a variety of tactics, including socioeconomic development accompanied by the acquisition of capabilities
equated with national and regional resilience.58
Security challenges doubtless provided the catalyst for the
organizational bridge-building as, at its inception, ASEAN was essentially a
grouping of anti-communist States in a turbulent region.59 However, the
Bangkok Declaration, which laid the foundation for ASEAN’s emergence,
conveyed a wider sense of purpose by emphasizing a long-term
commitment to economic growth, social progress, and cultural
development, in addition to the quest for peace and stability.60 The collapse
of pro-Western regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia, which led to a
diminished US military presence in Southeast Asia, acted as an impediment
to broadening of the institutional agenda in the 1970s but, paradoxically, it
also furnished additional impetus to the search for closer collaboration.61
Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia/Kampuchea,
which lasted from 1978 to 1990, put the collective willingness of member
56. See id. at 10 (“By the time SEATO dissolved in 1977, it had developed a highly
complex structure, but it was irrelevant to the security concerns or development of
regionalism in Southeast Asia.”).
57. See id. at 12–13 (noting the date of establishment, the founding members, and the
founding purposes of ASEAN).
58. See id. at 13 (“First, the ASEAN states sought to reduce the appeal of internal
Communist insurgencies by promoting domestic socio-economic development, expressing
this objective in the notions of ‘national’ and ‘regional resilience’ . . . Second ASEAN
sought to reduce the regional military influence of external actors.”).
59. See id. at 9–12 (discussing the failed efforts of SEATO, ASPAC, and ASA and the
necessity to develop an organization to deal with the territorial and political disputes
between the nations of Southeast Asia and one that could dissolve these tensions).
60. See NORMAN D. PALMER, THE NEW REGIONALISM IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 65
(1991) (noting that the main purposes of ASEAN were the acceleration of economic growth,
social progress and cultural development, as well as promoting regional peace and stability).
61. See NARINE, supra note 51, at 23–24 (explaining that while ASEAN began to
come together as an international organization, the Bali Conference and the two agreements
it produced, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amirt and Co-Operation
in Southeast Asia (TAC), failed to create significant economic cooperation between its
members).
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States to pursue this process coherently and determinately to a stern test,
and they generally rose to the challenge by playing a meaningful, albeit not
decisive, role in galvanizing and sustaining opposition to Vietnamese
actions.62 While this complex and protracted episode demonstrated the
limitations of the international capabilities of a small group of countries illequipped (at the time) economically and militarily to influence the outcome
of a large-scale regional conflict without high-level external direction and
support, it also showed that, within a decade following its establishment,
ASEAN was, for the most part, able to display the basic organizational
competencies needed to maintain adequate strategic cohesion and focus in
the face of serious adversity (which should not necessarily be equated with
broad-based institution building).63
Whether or not this qualifies as its ‘finest hour,’ a rather unique
ASEAN approach toward conflict management (‘the ASEAN Way’)
crystallized during that early phase of organizational evolution.64 Rooted in
the Malay cultural practices of mushawarah and mufukat, the ASEAN Way
emphasizes consultation and consensus in group decision-making.65
Poignant symbols are invoked and subtle, indirect tactics are relied upon in
an effort to promote a stable intramural environment.66 Problematic issues
are dealt with later, rather than sooner, in order to minimize possible
friction.67 Close contact among members of national elites is encouraged
with a view to fostering a sense of comfort, joint identity, mutual
obligation, and shared vision.68

62. See generally NARINE, supra note 51, at 39–65 (describing how Vietnam’s
invasion of Cambodia contributed to the growth of ASEAN as an institution, but also how
ASEAN was constrained by its own powers and its inability to call upon the help of outside
support, affecting the common interest of ASEAN in opposing Vietnam).
63. See NARINE, supra note 51, at 58–65 (noting that while Vietnam’s invasion of
Cambodia presented difficulties for ASEAN, “the organization’s institutional development
was enhanced by the . . . experience with the invasion of Cambodia.”).
64. See NARINE, supra note 51, at 11 (describing that many observers view the
“ASEAN Way’s” approach to regionalism as the core of “ASEAN’s viability”).
65. See ANTOLIK, supra note 38, at 99 (“Together, musfakat (consensus) and
mushawarah (consultation) ground ASEAN Diplomacy in village decision making.”).
66. See ANTOLIK, supra note 38, at 102–03 (noting that individual members of
ASEAN have developed their own views policy “nuances” or “trends” within ASEAN in
attempts to avoid tension amongst members).
67. See ANTOLIK, supra note 38, at 100 (“ASEAN consensus has handled difficult
choices by postponing difficult decisions to the future, leaving and living with the unsettled
issue for the present. . . . [p]ostponement and broad decisions prevent haggling from
destroying a positive mood.”).
68. See ANTOLIK, supra note 38, at 90 (noting that ASEAN member states send their
heads of government to take part in annual visits, described as empatmatas, which are oneon-one meetings between these leadersintended to promote continuing ASEAN solidarity).
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The final decade of the Cold War era saw an extension of the trends
that emerged during the preceding decade and a half.69 ASEAN was not
transformed into a security community, a body characterized by strict and
observed norms regarding non-use of force, geared toward military conflict
prevention; no competitive arms races; elaborate defense policy
coordination; robust institutional mechanisms, formal and informal, for
pacific dispute settlement; and substantial functional integration,
interdependence, and cooperation.70 Nevertheless, collaboration on the
national security front continued to expand and solidify.71
Internal disputes—primarily territorial in nature—persisted, but
communication intensified and interaction became increasingly productive,
to a point whereby some of the criteria for qualifying as a security
community may have been satisfied.72 External relations with United States,
a crucial pillar of the regional security structure, were handled adroitly and
harmoniously.73 External relations with China, which were perceived as a
threat, and required more intricate, strategic planning and more prudent
implementation, were also managed with adequate effectiveness and in a
fairly organized manner, including with respect to the thorny issues
stemming from disputes relating to the Spratly Islands’ status.74
69. See Amitav Acharya, A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?, 18 J.
STRATEGIC STUD. 175, 175 (1995) [hereinafter Acharya, Regional Security Community]
(introducing various trends that have led scholars to question whether ASEAN is a regional
security community).
70. See id. at 180 (defining three types of regional security systems; security regime,
security community, and defense community); see also AMITAV ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A
SECURITY COMMUNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN AND THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ORDER
19–21 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY]
(discussing the difference between a security regime and security community).
71. See Acharya, Regional Security Community, supra note 69, at 186 (noting that the
sturdy structure of ASEAN, involving trust, confidence, and goodwill between the member
states, has led to the development of “One Southeast Asia,” focusing on various peace
treaties between Southeast Asian States and admission of new members).
72. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 181–87
(applying the four characteristics of a security community to current conditions in Southeast
Asia to determine if ASEAN qualifies as a security community).
73. See Muthiah Alagappa, U.S.-ASEAN Security Relations: Challenges and
Prospects, 11 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 1, 3 (1989) (establishing that security relations between
the United States and the ASEAN countries during the late 1970s and 1980s was modest, yet
congenial, equal, and relatively low-cost, making it a more mature and mutually beneficial
relationship).
74. See Chang Pao-Min, China and Southeast Asia: The Problem of a Perceptional
Gap, 9 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 181, 188–90 (1987) (discussing longstanding fears in Southeast
Asia regarding China’s communist character, imperialist nature and aggressive politics); see
also Pao-Min Chang, A New Scramble for the South China Sea Islands, 12 CONTEMP. SE.
ASIA 20, 30–31 (1990) (describing the willingness of all claimant states to settle, through
peaceful means, the March 1988 clash between Vietnam and China over the Spratly Islands).
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The institutional foundations built during those twenty-five years,
coupled with the de-escalation of regional tensions following the end of the
Cold War, have paved the way for the enlargement of ASEAN.75 The
joining of Brunei in 1984, after it gained independence over its external
affairs, may be viewed as a straightforward affair.76 However, the granting
of membership to Vietnam, Laos, Burma/Myanmar, and Cambodia, former
foes and uneasy partners, may be legitimately regarded as a quantum leap
forward, reflecting considerable organizational capabilities, rather than
simply an improved global and regional security environment.77
The decommunization of Southeast Asia and the ongoing process
of liberalization in China have not necessarily brought lingering territorial
disputes to an end, and have not eliminated the residue of distrust—but they
have transformed the regional landscape sufficiently to render the collective
pursuit of stability a less pressing goal. The ASEAN-Plus-Three (APT)
framework is a reflection of the new geostrategic realities.78 The forum is
now more than a decade old and, while it is predominantly an economic
institutional vehicle, the growing cooperation with three key East Asian
countries, notably China (the other two being Japan and South Korea), is
indicative of the region’s metamorphosis from an arena of war to one of
peaceful coexistence.79 The tentative emergence of looser structures, such
as ASEAN-Plus-Six (APS; which also includes India, Australia, and New

75. See GERALD TAN, ASEAN: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION 31
(2003) (“With the fall of the Communism and the end of the Cold War . . . the need to
maintain ASEAN’s relevance to changing regional and international condition pointed to the
necessity of having a larger regional grouping . . . of the countries in Southeast Asia.”).
76. See ANTOLIK, supra note 38, at 83–87 (discussing the bridging that occurred
between Brunei and its two large neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, leading to admission of
Brunei to ASEAN).
77. See TAN, supra note 75, at 31–37 (emphasizing that the inclusion of these former
Indo-Chinese states was a major turning point, as the idea of including thes countries would
have been “unthinkable” years ago and noting that this demonstratesability of ASEAN to
adjust and adapt).
78. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 248 (“ASEAN+3 is a powerful
extension of ASEAN: it includes the region’s most dynamic economy (the PRC), its most
advanced (Japan), and its largest newly industrialized economy (the Republic of Korea).”).
79. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 248 (noting that ASEAN+3,
ASEAN, and other regional groups are economic in focus, they are also responsible for
forging greater mutual understandings and stronger foundations for regional cooperative
initiatives); Akihiko Tanaka, The Development of the ASEAN+3 Framework, in ADVANCING
EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM 52, 59–60 (Melissa G. Curley & Nicholas Thomas eds., 2007)
(discussing the ASEAN countries’ decision to accept China, Japan, and South Korea as
members to ASEAN and, additionally, the member states’ changing policy stance towards
these three countries).
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Zealand) and ASEAN-Plus-Eight (APE; which also includes Russia and the
United States) is consistent with this pattern.80
The quest for an ASEAN security community is by no means a
thing of the past. Indeed, in a 2003 summit held in Bali, leaders from
member countries reaffirmed the vision and incorporated it firmly into the
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, or Bali Concord II, a comprehensive
document embodying their aspirations for a regional community
encompassing a wide range of economic, political, and social activities.81
Nevertheless, as the threat of military conflict has receded into the
background and the forces of finance, production, trade, and investment
have asserted themselves, economic cooperation has supplanted the security
variant as the key factor driving ASEAN in the direction of a viable,
regional community.82
From the 1967 Bangkok Declaration to the 1976 Bali Conference,
which produced two significant agreements, the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
(TAC), the organization had consistently accorded high priority to regional
economic collaboration, but with limited success.83 Geographical proximity
and country similarity are merely two of several variables which impinge
on trade and investment decisions.84 And, for nearly three decades, they
could not offset the impact of the myriad influences, political as well as
economic, which prevented ASEAN from achieving closer integration or
interdependence through these vital channels.85
80. See generally RODOLFO C. SEVERINO, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN SEARCH OF AN ASEAN
COMMUNITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE FORMER ASEAN SECRETARY-GENERAL (2006) (providing
insight on ASEAN and its relationships with member-countries).
81. See RODOLFO C. SEVERINO, TOWARDS AN ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY 1 (2004)
[Severino, TOWARDS AN ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY] (“The declaration embodied the
ASEAN leaders’ decisions to establish an ASEAN Community made up of three
components—the ASEAN security community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.”).
82. See id. at 2 (“In substance, security is at the core of ASEAN’s
existence . . . regional economic cooperation and integration is seen as part of the endeavor
to bolster regional security through economic development, even as security continues to be
regarded as an essential condition for development.”).
83. See id. at 5–6 (discussing how the focus of the organization was on security
cooperation, rather than economic cooperation).
84. See DANIELS, RADEBAUGH, & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 266. The authors discuss
how countries limit imports of certain foreign products and services to maintain identity. Id.
For example, “for many years, Japan, South Korea, and China maintained an almost total
ban on rise imports, largely because rice farming has been historically cohesive force in each
nation.” Id.
85. See Amado Castro, ASEAN Economic Co-operation, in UNDERSTANDING ASEAN
70, 74 (Alison Broinowski ed., 1982) (noting that the implementation of economic
cooperation was limited in these early years because of conceptualization and organization,
and the involvement of foreign ministers); Richard Stubbs, Reluctant Leader, Expectant
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Bottom-up impulses, emanating from the marketplace, have
invigorated the regional economic dynamics in the past two decades.86 The
formation of cross-border production networks has played a crucial role in
the process.87 This phenomenon is attributable to advances in information
technology and declining transportation costs (as well as the policy-induced
lowering of barriers to the flow of goods, services, and capital).88 It has led
to product fragmentation, or the allocation of distinct, but inter-related
manufacturing activities to sites in different countries.89 The trend could
have resulted in a global dispersion of production, yet it has proved more
conducive to fortifying links among neighboring countries and stimulating
intraregional trade, investment, and finance.90
Interestingly, the structural economic readjustment has not
materialized in a political vacuum. As the Southeast Asian developmental
State (originally an East Asian blueprint) has taken shape in the region, it
has turned into a determined promoter of cross-border trade, investment,

Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia, 46 INT’L J. 649, 653 (1991) (focusing on Japan’s
emergence as a regional leader as a variable affecting ASEAN countries and preventing
them from achieving closer integration); Richard Stubbs, Geopolitics and the Political
Economy of Southeast Asia, 44 INT’L J. 517, 517–20 (1989) (discussing how the Korean
War, the Vietnam War, and Japanese Investment are regional security and geopolitical
considerations that have had an impact on the region’s economic development since the
Second World War). See generally MARJORIE L. SURIYAMONGKOL, POLITICS OF ASEAN
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION: THE CASE OF ASEAN INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS (1988) (focusing on
the political process by which ASEAN economic co-operation has been shaped and on largescale industrial projects); John Ravenhill, Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia:
Changing Incentives, 35 ASIAN SURV. 850 (1995) (discussing AFTA and its likely success in
light of ASEAN’s previous record of failed integration).
86. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 242 (“Asia’s approach to
regionalism is pragmatic and flexible. . . . [i]t is based on a bottom-approach that supports
markets and sub-regional cooperation as the building blocks for an eventual broader deeper
and more unified regional architecture.”).
87. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 75 (“[C]ross-border production
networks have created new opportunities for other East Asian economies to specialize in
parts and components production and assembly.”).
88. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 45–46 (“The key technological
explanation—the development of production networks, often described as ‘production
fragmentation’ is the result of advance in information technology, trade barriers, and
declining trade barriers.”).
89. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 46 (“These development have
made it possible to allocate various steps of a manufacturing production process to sites in
different countries.”).
90. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 45 (“Asia is not alone in
displaying such an increasing regional bias; technology and policy seem to be generating
new opportunities for regional integration, even in the context of a rapidly globalizing world
economy.”).
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and finance.91 This configuration is a variant of corporatism, but one
characterized by greater government involvement (by Western standards) in
the economy and enmeshment in society.92 It is a form of State capitalism
featuring government activism geared toward furthering the interests of the
corporate sector as a whole by creating conditions favorable to capital
accumulation and productivity enhancement.93

91. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 17–18 (“While Asia can draw
on other region’s experience, Asian regionalism is ultimately likely to follow a distinctive
blueprint, building on Asian economic priorities and based on an Asia vision for building a
regional community.”).
92. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925–1975, at 197 (1982) (“The causes of post-World War II Japanesestyle “corporatism” were similar, but it’s priorities were different, and the state played a role
that went beyond mediation. . . . [u]nder these circumstances the role of the state was never
questioned.”).
93. See generally id. (attributing the unprecedented growth of Japan’s economy to the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and emphasizing its central role in the
economic and political history of modern Japan); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEW ASIAN
INDUSTRIALISM (Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987) (various articles discussing the economic
organization and industrialization of Asia); ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH
KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989) (examining South Korean economic growth,
which is strongly based on state intervention and the government’s imposition of strict
performance guidelines on the industries and companies that it supports); ROBERT WADE,
GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST
ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990) (taking aim at critics who attribute the economic success
of Taiwan and other countries to government intervention and, instead, focusing on
allocation decisions that were made by markets and public administration); THE WORLD
BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993) (arguing
that the growth and success of East Asian economies is due to the accumulation and
allocation of physical and human capital); BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN INDUSTRIALISING
ASIA (Andrew MacIntyre ed., 1994) (focusing on the interaction between business and
government in Northeast and Southeast Asia to determine how these political arrangements,
or institutions, constrain policy and performance); PETER B. EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY:
STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION (1995) (evaluating the success and failure of
state involvement in the process of industrialization by comparing state organization of a
variety of countries); BEYOND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: EAST ASIA’S POLITICAL
ECONOMIES RECONSIDERED (Steve Chan, Cal Clark & Danny Lam eds., 1998) (critiquing the
developmental state model and placing emphasis on the nature of society, culture, market,
and the evolving international economy in East Asia’s developmental history); THE
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (Meredith Woo-Cumings ed., 1999) (examining the political,
bureaucratic, and financial influences that have shaped the East Asian developmental state);
MING XIA, THE DUAL DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHINA’S TRANSITION (2000) (contemplating the creation
of a market-orientated economy in China, which can be attributed to decentralization and
legislative empowerment that have led to the reduction in transaction costs and the creation
of markets); CHANGING GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EAST ASIA (Ka H. Mok & Ray
Forrest eds., 2009) (focusing on the impacts of liberalization and marketizing trends in
Southeast Asia and how these trends affect public policy).
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There is a considerable literature, revolving around Singapore and
its government/Temasek-linked companies (GLCs/TLCs), which highlights
the resolve that the Southeast Asian developmental State has exhibited in
encouraging the corporate sector to pursue regional strategies (rather than
merely following the latter).94 This has entailed direction, persuasion,
signaling, facilitation, provision of incentives, and willingness to channel
substantial funds toward supporting the effort (e.g., by investing heavily in
appropriate physical infrastructure).95 Key events with broad geographical
repercussions, typically exogenous shocks, such as the 1997/98 Asian
financial crisis, have also had the effect of prompting governments to seek
closer cross-border economic cooperation within ASEAN.96
Perhaps the most significant initiative to that end, symbolically and
practically, was the proposal, floated by Thailand at the 1991 Economic
Ministers’ Meeting, and endorsed at the 1992 Summit, to create an ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA) for manufactures.97 The primary instrument for
achieving this goal has been the Common Preferential Effective Tariff
(CPET) scheme, which has reduced substantially tariffs on goods
originating within ASEAN, but has stopped short of transforming the
organization into a customs union adhering to a common external tariff for
goods entering from other jurisdictions.98 Over the years, this arrangement
has expanded into AFTA-Plus and has featured measures to develop
uniform product certification standards, eliminate non-tariff barriers,
encourage region-wide joint ventures, facilitate corporate vertical
integration (via industrial complementation; AIP), harmonize customs
nomenclature, narrow differences in valuation procedures, promote regional
94. See FAIZAL B. YAHYA, ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN SINGAPORE AND INDIA:
AN ALLIANCE IN THE MAKING? 17 (2008) (“The engagement of the Singaporean corporate
sector with India would also include an analysis on how the state in Singapore is in the
driving seat of this engagement policy called regionalization.”).
95. See id. at 17–27 (noting that for developmental states to remain competitive they
must reach a wide market and that the governments of both Singapore and Indiahave
encouraged “companies and investors to diversify and seek newly emerging economies,” to
“invest abroad,” to develop the infrastructure of the two countries).
96. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 31–32 (“The crisis also had a
silver lining . . . [i]t also highlighted Asia’s growing interdependence, weaknesses in the
global financial system, and thus the benefits of Asian cooperation.”).
97. See Paul Bowles, ASEAN, AFTA and the “New Regionalism”, 70 PAC. AFFAIRS
219, 222 (1997) [hereinafter Bowles, New Regionalism] (“A mere five years later, however,
with intra-ASEAN trade even lower, Thailand’s proposal for an ASEAN Free Trade Area
was unanimously adopted.”).
98. See Hadi Soesastro, ASEAN Economic Cooperation: The Long Journey to AFTA,
23 INDONESIAN Q. 25, 34 (1995) (“The mechanism to achieve a free trade area is the
Common Effective Preferential Tarrif (CEPT) scheme. . . . whereas under CEPT there is
reciprocity in that once the good is accepted to be under CEPT all countries must give the
preferential tariff.”).
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industrial projects (AIPs), stimulate regional investment, and tighten intrasector collaboration (in communications, financial services, natural
resources, tourism, and transportation).99 Like the ASEAN Regional Forum,
its security equivalent or near equivalent,100 AFTA has been underpinned
99. See TAN, supra note 75, at 234–76 (discussing the evolution of ASEAN from a
regional organization designed to promote political stability to its increasing role in world
trade). See generally Ravenhill, supra note 85 (discussing AFTA and its likely success in
light of ASEAN’s previous record of failed attempts at integration); Soesastro, supra note 98
(reviewing the evolution of the ASEAN Economic Cooperation (AEC) scheme and its
contribution to the development of AFTA); Paul Bowles & Brian MacLean, Understanding
Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, 3 REV. INT’L POL. ECON.
319 (1996) (concluding that mainstream economic approaches do not provide a satisfactory
explanation for the formation of AFTA and demanding an analysis of the political economy
of ASEAN states); JAYANT MENON, ADJUSTING TOWARD AFTA (1996) (analyzing the
dynamics of trade in the ASEAN countries and identifying the likely cost adjustments
associated with liberalization of trade); AFTA IN THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
(Joseph L. H. Tan ed., 1996) (examining trade, the ASEAN regional grouping, and the
relationships between ASEAN, the United States, Japan, and the European Union as trade
partners); ASEAN SECRETARIAT, ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION: TRANSITION AND
TRANSFORMATION (1997) (discussing the significant changes that have taken place in
ASEAN economic cooperation); Bowles, New Regionalism, supra note 97 (considering why
ASEAN chose to form AFTA in 1993 after previous economic schemes of limited scope,
and how the formation of AFTA relates to the latest wave of regionalism in the world
economy); Chia Siow Yue, The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 11 PAC. REV. 213 (1998)
(discussing the formation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, improvements to AFTA since its
inception, and the complications that the enlargement of AFTA membership has had on the
market integration process); Richard Stubbs, Signing On to Liberalization: AFTA and the
Politics of Regional Economic Cooperation, 13 PAC. REV. 297 (2000) (noting that the
success of AFTA may be attributed to a shift in the domestic balance of power in Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and to the regional cooperation that has developed
among the ASEAN members); Nattapong Thongpakde, ASEAN Free Trade Area: Progress
and Challenges, in ASEAN BEYOND THE REGIONAL CRISIS: CHALLENGES AND INITIATIVES 48
(Mya Than ed., 2001) (taking a retrospective view on the development of the ASEAN Free
Trade Area); Nick J. Freeman, ASEAN Investment Area: Progress and Challenges, in
ASEAN BEYOND THE REGIONAL CRISIS: CHALLENGES AND INITIATIVES 80 (Mya Than ed.,
2001) (discussing the ASEAN Investment Area initiative); GLOBALISATION, DOMESTIC
POLITICS AND REGIONALISM: THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (Helen E.S. Nesadurai ed.,
2003) [hereinafter GLOBALISATION, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND REGIONALISM] (analyzing the
relationship between globalization and regionalism through an examination of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA) project); ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA: SOURCE BOOK (Donald
Howell Miller ed., 2003) (providing business managers with a source for how AFTA will
work, addressing the benefits they can derive from AFTA, and summarizing important facts
as a starting point for research in developing their business plans).
100. See generally MICHAEL LEIFER, THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: EXTENDING
ASEAN’S MODEL OF REGIONAL SECURITY 3 (1996) (“This Paper examines the province and
so-far limited experience of the ARF as an extension of ASEAN’s model of regional security
and assesses its suitability for its declared purpose of enhancing political and security
cooperation within the wider Asia-Pacific region.”); RODOLFO C. SEVERINO, THE ASEAN
REGIONAL FORUM (2009) [hereinafter Severino, The ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM] (discussing
the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum and characterizing the ARF as a
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by genuinely-shared interests.101 Individually, member States have lacked
sufficient economies of scale and leverage to counter trends toward
regionalization of business activity in other parts of the world and to
participate effectively in international economic negotiations.102 The
emergence of China as a magnet for trade and investment has posed a
particular challenge from the 1990s onward and called for a strategic
response designed to minimize the adverse consequences of its inherent
attractions to exporters, importers, and purveyors of foreign capital.103 In
the liberal climate prevailing in the past two decades, pursuing this tack has
been a relatively low-cost political proposition.104
AFTA is often portrayed as the cornerstone of the evolving
ASEAN economic community (AEC), complementing the corresponding
security structure, which was historically more deep-rooted, but which in
the current circumstances is perhaps exerting less influence on institutional
dynamics.105 Indeed, an ambitious blueprint was designed in 2003, and
refined in 2007, to fulfill the vision of a truly integrated economic
community by as early as 2015 (initially 2020).106 It envisages the
transformation of ASEAN into an entity characterized by a completely
unfettered flow of goods, services, investment, capital, and skilled labor. 107
mechanism for consultation and dialogue among states in East Asia with interests in political
and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region).
101. See Seiji Naya & Pearl Imada, Implementing AFTA, 1992–2007, in THE ASEAN
READER 513, 513–15 (K.S. Sandhu et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the shared interests that lead
to the creation of AFTA, specifically the pooling of resources and sharing of markets).
102. See GLOBALISATION, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND REGIONALISM, supra note 99, at 6
(“[S]ome dynamic gains from exploiting scale economies in AFTA were expected to boost
the project’s overall welfare gains . . . .”).
103. See Bowles, New Regionalism, supra note 97, at 223–24 (explaining that the risk
of diverting investment away from other Asian countries, as a result of increased
competition from China, is one of the driving forces behind the creation of the AFTA).
104. See GLOBALISATION, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND REGIONALISM, supra note 99, at
172–74 (stating that the diversion of investment to other parts of the world, most notably to
China, was the motivation for adopting and sustaining AFTA as a project of open
regionalism).
105. See Severino, The ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM, supra 100, at 1–3 (discussing the
importance of security as a policy goal to the ASEAN economic community).
106. See Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ASEAN Roundtable 2008: ASEAN
Economic Community Blueprint, in 4 ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BLUEPRINT 1, 4
(2009) (“In 2003, ASEAN embarked on a bold project to accelerate the integration of the
regional economy and establish an ASEAN Economic Community by 2020 . . . [l]ater, that
deadline was brought forward to 2015.”).
107. See id. (“The AEC envisages ASEAN as a single market and production base with
free flow of goods, services, investments, capital and skilled labour.”). See generally
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES, 1 THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: UNBLOCKING THE
ROADBLOCKS (2008) (beginning with a brief account of the important points raised during a
workshop on “The ASEAN Community: Unblocking Roadblocks” and followed by short
papers, both of which aid in appreciating the benefits of a comprehensive regional
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Evidence regarding progress on the socio-cultural front is less
apparent but not altogether absent.108 On socio-cultural matters, regional
cooperation has manifested itself, albeit not decisively, in efforts to boost
education (including literacy),109 to contain ethnic and religious conflicts,110
to preserve indigenous traditions in the face of the encroaching forces of
modernization, rather than embrace the melting-pot model, 111 and to
support social equality and justice.112 While the impact may have been
modest thus far, to the extent that ASEAN is a dynamic entity, it is
noteworthy that a socio-cultural component is an integral part of the multidimensional blueprint outlining in strategic terms a vision of a genuine
ASEAN community spanning all key policy domains.113

community); INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES, REALIZING THE ASEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT (Michael G. Plummer & Chia Siow Yue eds.,
2009) (commenting on ASEAN’s decision to create the ASEAN Economic Community to
promote deeper economic integration and discussing the benefits and costs of the AEC).
108. See Carolina S. Guina, The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, in 1 THE ASEAN
COMMUNITY: UNBLOCKING THE ROADBLOCKS 65 (2008) (“While the blueprint of the ASEAN
Economic Community has been completed, that of the ASCC [ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community] is still a work in progress . . . .”).
109. See Aline K. Wong & Paul P. L. Cheung, Demographic and Social Development:
Taking Stock for the Morrow, in THE ASEAN READER 145, 148 (K.S. Sandhu et al. eds.,
1992) (“Another major aspect of ASEAN’s social development is its educational
transformation. . . . [t]he trend toward broad-based and longer formal education is clearly
evident in all ASEAN countries.”); Ungku A. Aziz, Co-operation on Education in ASEAN,
in THE ASEAN READER 167, 167–68 (K.S. Sandhu et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the
connection between ASEAN education and ASEAN awareness, and pointing out that
cooperation on education in the ASEAN region has been successful).
110. See Wang Gungwu, Ethnicity and Religion in Social Development, in THE ASEAN
READER 175, 175–77 (K.S. Sandhu et al. eds., 1992) (discussing three historical phases in the
ASEAN region and considering the political implications of religion and ethnicity in
ASEAN).
111. See Lau Teik Soon, Cultural Co-operation Between the ASEAN States, in THE
ASEAN READER 141, 141–44 (K.S. Sandhu et al. eds., 1992) (“As urbanization is
proceeding, there is in ASEAN today a great concern for the preservation and development
of the various cultures.”).
112. See John E. Walsh, Cultural Components of the Search for Social Justice in
ASEAN: A Westerner’s View, in THE ASEAN READER 161, 161 (K.S. Sandhu et al. eds.,
1992) (“One of the many impressive and distinctive things about ASEAN . . . is that it may
be the only regional organization or association that has made a formal commitment to the
achieving of social justice at the regional level.”).
113. See Severino, The ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM, supra 100, at 368–70 (arguing that
the development of a socio-cultural community is necessary for ASEAN to develop an
ASEAN Community); Severino, TOWARDS AN ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note
81, at 1–3 (pointing out the creation of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community as critical to
economic, social, and cultural cooperation); Guina, supra note 108, at 65–70 (describing the
ASCC as a “work-in-progress” and providing suggestions to move the ASCC towards its
aspiration of fostering a shared cultural identity).
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Although a regional entity and its institutions (i.e., a regime) should
not be identified solely with formal instruments, having adopted a charter
and constitution in 2007 (ratified by members by late 2008),114 ASEAN
may now be viewed as a broad-based legal community as well.115 For the
first four decades of its existence, the organization had primarily relied on
tacit understandings (e.g., the ‘ASEAN Way’) and a few technically
binding accords (e.g., AFTA), whose implementation had largely depended
on members’ voluntary compliance.116 By the same token, ASEAN’s
institutional foundations (e.g., the Secretariat, its de facto executive arm)
had remained weak despite periodic attempts to fortify them.117 The
adoption of a charter may thus be viewed as a crucial step in the evolution
toward a comprehensive and viable regional community.118

114. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, The ASEAN Charter: Making Sense Out of Mixed
Responses, in THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: UNBLOCKING THE ROADBLOCKS, supra note 109, at
84 (“The ASEAN Charter was formally adopted by ASEAN’s leaders on 20 November
2007.”).
115. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, The ASEAN Charter: Making Sense Out of Mixed
Responses, in THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: UNBLOCKING THE ROADBLOCKS, supra note 109, at
85 (“ASEAN officials have explained that the Charter would establish the association as a
‘jurisdictional personality and a legal entity . . . .’”).
116. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, The ASEAN Charter: Making Sense Out of Mixed
Responses, in THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: UNBLOCKING THE ROADBLOCKS, supra note 109, at
87 (“We also note that the ASEAN practice of compliance has, so far, been largely voluntary
in nature.”).
117. See Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic
Integration, 29 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 406, 420 (2007) (“[T]he status and authority of the
Secretary-General were significantly enhanced in 1992. . . .Nevertheless, partly for
budgetary reasons and partly as a result of deliberate policy, the Secretariat remains
circumscribed in its ability to propose intellectual positions and take substantial
initiatives.”).
118. See generally Locknie Hsu, The ASEAN Charter and a Legal Identity for ASEAN,
in THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: UNBLOCKING THE ROADBLOCKS 71, 74–75 (2008) (explaining
that the ASEAN charter provides direction and symbolism to the group’s effort to become a
more cohesive and orderly institution); Mely Caballero-Anthony, The ASEAN Charter:
Making Sense Out of Mixed Responses, in THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: UNBLOCKING THE
ROADBLOCKS, 84, 84–95 (2008) (commenting on the ASEAN charter’s ability to accord
ASEAN legal personality, to establish accountability and compliance, and to reinforce the
perception of ASEAN as a serious regional player); RODOLFO C. SEVERINO, FRAMING THE
ASEAN CHARTER: AN ISEAS PERSPECTIVE 1–3 (2005) (highlighting proposed ideas for the
adoption of the ASEAN charter, such as giving ASEAN a legal personality and making
ASEAN a more responsive, dynamic and integrated regional organization).
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III. Theoretical Ramifications
Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has grown in size and
stature, and has overcome manifold strains, both external and internal.119 It
has experienced setbacks and long periods marked by institutional inertia,
but it has adapted and has continued to expand its strategic agenda.120
Despite the pull of globalization and the trend toward broader East Asian
integration, at least in the economic sense of the term, ASEAN has not seen
an erosion of its Southeast Asian geographical boundaries—and its distinct
aspirations have turned increasingly lofty. To all appearances, it is now on
the verge of becoming a full-fledged regional community.121
Indeed, some academic observers assert that, for all intents and
purposes, ASEAN already qualifies as such.122 They employ sociological
tools to advance the proposition that the organization’s extensive and
increasingly complex operations have transformed it into a cohesive entity
which, in constructivist terms, displays a strong regional identity.123 From a
regime perspective, ASEAN shares common norms and practices,
underpinned by a bond of belonging or a sense of ‘we feeling’ which ties
members closely together.124 The group-wide principles and psychological
attachments override individual interests and identities.125
119. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 5–6
(“Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN has lived through a major shift in the regional
strategic environment of Southeast Asia. . . . by the early 1990s its members could claim
their grouping to be one of the most successful experiments in regional cooperation in the
developing world.”).
120. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 6–7
(commenting on ASEAN reform efforts in response to criticism and perceived shortcomings
including a vision to build an ASEAN community by 2020).
121. See Chin Kin Wah, ASEAN: The Long Road to “One Southeast Asia”, 5 ASIAN J.
OF POL. SCI. 1, 2 (1997) (“Over the years, ASEAN . . . has acquired a reputation as a
successful regional community . . . .”).
122. See id. (claiming ASEAN has developed a reputation as a successful regional
community).
123. See Nikolas Busse, Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security, 12 PAC. REV. 39,
53–55 (1999) (indicating the growing empathy among the foreign policies of the ASEAN
states, the increased assertiveness of its dealings with the outside world, and the unlikeliness
of war among founding members which indicate the emergence of a collective identity).
124. See id. at 53 (“The States involved develop a feeling of togetherness because
norms are shared and not held individually . . . such a process took place among the
founding members of ASEAN.”).
125. See generally ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70
(examining ASEAN’s record in managing regional order by focusing on both its
accomplishments and its failures and making a case for adopting a sociological approach to
the study of regionalism); THE ASEAN SUCCESS STORY: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL
DIMENSIONS (Linda G. Martin ed., 1987) (examining from several perspectives the factors
underlying ASEAN success as well as documenting its failures); Chin Kin Wah, supra note
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Norms vary in their institutional impact. Some lack substantial
depth in that they merely specify the rules according to which States may
pursue their preferences.126 Others extend further by defining the roles that
determine how States come to understand those preferences.127 The former
are referred to as ‘regulatory’ and the latter as ‘constitutive.’128 It is
assumed that, as a regime, ASEAN has progressed beyond the regulatory
level and functions as a constitutive body (Figure 1).129 This position has
been expressed with respect to patterns seen in the security domain,130 but it
has been implicitly invoked in studies focusing on economic integration,
interdependence, and cooperation.131

121, at 1–19 (discussing the expansion of ASEAN and the move towards “One Southeast
Asia”); Busse, supra note 123, at 53–55 (providing examples which highlight the
development of ASEAN’s collective identity).
126. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 26
(describing regulatory norms as only proscribing and regulating behavior).
127. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 26
(describing constitutive norms as defining and constituting identities).
128. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 26
(“Norms not only proscribe and regulate behavior [the regulatory effect], they also define
and constitute identities [the constitutive effect].”).
129. See generally ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70
(assessing whether the norms of ASEAN have had a regulatory impact and whether they
might have created a sense of regional community).
130. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 25–29
(explaining that, in security communities, states develop a sense of we feeling from repeated
adherence to norms can be seen in the ASEAN context through the expression of the
“ASEAN Way”).
131. See generally ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 244–49
(characterizing the development towards Asian regionalism as a gradual process complicated
by broad, varied and overlapping regional institutions); Alfredo C. Robles, Jr., The ASEAN
Free Trade Area and the Construction of a Southeast Asian Economic Community in East
Asia, 12 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 78, 89–96 (2004) (commenting on the desire of ASEAN to have
foreign markets perceive Southeast Asia as a single region rather than a collection of
different investment locations); Severino, The ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM, supra 100, at 422
(“It [ASEAN] has fostered a certain level of regional affinity among certain sectors of the
region’s elites.”).
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Figure 1132
Model of International Community Formation
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However, that view is not universally held. A considerable number
of scholars harbor skepticism regarding the notion that the decades-long
ASEAN experience has socialized members into acquiring a meaningful
sense of regional identity and that this identity has significantly impinged
on their behavior vis-a-vis each other and non-members.133 They claim that
the organization has been designed as an instrument to enable members to
pursue their narrow interests and has consistently served as such.134 Its
institutional foundations have been weak and incapable of effectively
supporting multilateral endeavors, which, in any event, have generated little

132. Adapted from: ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70,
at 31.
133. See MICHAEL LEIFER, ASEAN AND THE SECURITY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA 153–59
(1989) (arguing that while ASEAN has developed some sense of regional identity it has yet
to transcend the pull of more narrow state interest).
134. See id. at 153 (“Member governments have viewed their participation in terms of
how their separate interests might best be served.”).
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enthusiasm in policy circles.135 ASEAN has proved useful to members at
various junctures, individually and collectively, but it has not exhibited the
strategic and psychological attributes of a genuine regional community.136
The absence of an overarching purpose and the fragility of
attitudinal bonds have apparently become evident on several occasions,
notably during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis.137 This severely
disruptive event harshly exposed ASEAN’S limitations and vulnerabilities
as a player in the global and regional arenas.138 It also brought into sharp
focus deep-seated organizational fissures, which may have been
conveniently concealed behind a shallow facade of symbolic institutional
unity.139 A legitimate reading of the situation was that, in the face of intense
politico-economic pressures, member States promptly turned inward and
abandoned any efforts to formulate a coherent and productive regional
response.140
135. See Ralf Emmers, International Regime-Building in ASEAN: Cooperation Against
the Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Drugs, 29 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 506, 519 (2007) (“Instead,
most of the action adopted by the ten ASEAN countries . . . has primarily taken place at a
unilateral and bilateral level rather than multilaterally.”).
136. See generally LEIFER, supra note 133 (outlining the issues involved in the
formation of ASEAN and summarizing the events that have shaped the organization’s
development); JEANNIE HENDERSON, REASSESSING ASEAN (1999) (discussing how
ASEAN’s expansion has resulted in numerous challenges which threaten to undermine the
group’s ability to establish an integrated regional identity); Jürgen Rüland, ASEAN and the
Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian
Regionalism, 13 PAC. REV. 421, 443 (2000) [hereinafter Rüland, Asian Crisis] (“The norms
constituting ASEAN’s collective identity still produce only a thin layer of institutionalism
cast over essentially realist behavior.”); Emmers, supra note 138, at 519–22 (arguing that the
failures in the war on drugs in Southeast Asia are due in large part to the inability of ASEAN
to establish a genuine regional community); Donald K. Emmerson, Challenging ASEAN: A
“Topological” View, 29 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 424, 429–31 (2007) (arguing that in order for
ASEAN to become a regional community it must democratize its decision making process);
Jürgen Rüland, Deepening ASEAN Cooperation Through Democratization? The Indonesian
Legislature and Foreign Policymaking, 9 INT’L REL. ASIA-PAC. 373, 373–402 (2009)
(questioning whether recent reforms by ASEAN have actually furthered regional integration,
and arguing that the causal relationship between democracy and regional integration is more
complex).
137. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 424 (“Yet, the crisis has exacerbated
contradictions in ASEAN cooperation and exposed institutional which were previously
swept under the carpet.”).
138. See HENDERSON, supra note 136, at 42 (“ASEAN had no effective response to the
economic crisis.”).
139. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 428 (“[A] closer look [at the response
to the 1997/1998 crisis] reveals a strong dose of realist thinking behind the façade of
ASEAN solidarity.”).
140. See generally Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136 (arguing that the Asian crisis
has thrown the collective identity of ASEAN into disarray, which calls into question
constructivist approaches); SOUTHEAST ASIA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS: ORIGINS, LESSONS, AND
THE WAY FORWARD (H.W. Arndt & Hal Hill eds., 1999) (discussing the difficulties that
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This abrupt retreat into neo-isolationism and the politics of selfinterest has re-opened the theoretical debate about the essence of
international cooperation in Southeast Asia.141 Before States in the region
began to engage in meaningful cross-border bridge-building, their external
maneuvers were viewed primarily through a realist lens.142 In the anarchic
post-Second World War environment, characterized by a precarious
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, with
China looming in the shadows and ideological conflicts abounding across a
volatile Asian continent, the development of capabilities geared toward
survival was seen as the dominant motive shaping State conduct.143
International interaction was regarded as a zero-sum game, leaving virtually
no scope for genuine collaboration, other than for purely instrumental
purposes.144
As the Cold War has fizzled out, regional conflicts have subsided,
and ASEAN has started to display signs of cohesion—at least periodically
and selectively, realist approaches have receded into the background.145
Liberal institutionalism and institutional constructivism have come into
ASEAN had in conducting an effective regional response to the Asian financial crisis);
Chang Li Lin & Ramkishen S. Rajan, Regional Responses to the Southeast Asian Financial
Crisis: A Case of Self-Help or No Help?, 53 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 261, 261 (1999) (“The
crisis and the responses to it have revealed that unless there is greater institutionalism,
ASEAN countries would continue to look outside the region for assistance to facilitate their
recovery.”); Michael Wesley, The Asian Crisis and the Adequacy of Regional Institutions,
21 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 54 (1999) (explaining that the regional response to the Asian
financial crisis was ineffective and regional reform efforts are needed to protect against
financial instability); Stuart Harris, Asian Multilateral Institutions and their Response to the
Asian Economic Crisis: The Regional and Global Implications, 13 PAC. REV. 495 (2000)
(arguing that the Asian economic crisis revealed weaknesses of regional multilateral
institutions but that, despite the inadequacy of the response by those institutions, it was far
from negligible).
141. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 423 (“The Asian crisis is an invitation
to revisit the theoretical arguments exchanged in the last decade . . . [some argue] that the
institutional and constructivist requiems for realism were premature . . . for instance [a
study] has shown that under adverse conditions integration may recede through retrenchment
and spillback.”).
142. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 421–22 (explaining that until the
1990s Southeast Asia was viewed primarily through the realist paradigm).
143. See Severino, The ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM, supra 100, at 408 (“The
antagonistic relations among China, the Soviet Union and the United States and its Asian
allies, including Japan, made for great instability and insecurity in East Asia.”).
144. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 422 (“In the zero-sum nature of
international relations, the behavior of states was guided by a primacy of relative over
absolute gains.”).
145. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 422 (“In post-Cold War Southeast
Asia, one argument goes, the danger of wars has markedly declined . . . [c]onfidencebuilding measures, preventative diplomacy and other institutional strategies have now
entered the security agenda.”).
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vogue as analytical vehicles for interpreting State behavior in general, and
in the Southeast Asian context in particular.146 While not consigning selfinterest to intellectual oblivion, liberal institutionalism lays emphasis on the
concrete benefits derived from cooperation (notably in enduring
relationships, as distinct from one-off relationships), and the
interdependencies among players in the global arena, portraying
international interaction as mostly a positive-sum game.147
Institutional constructivism differs from realism and liberal
institutionalism in that it relaxes, even jettisons, the assumption that States
are rational entities that weigh systematically the advantages and
disadvantages of competing strategies.148 Rather, institutional
constructivism embraces a reflexivist perspective by positing that the
factors (including material interests) that influence State conduct are not
exogenously given, but emerge as the product of ongoing involvement in
international processes and structural adaptation.149 Collective identities,
such as those apparently observed in Southeast Asia, play a crucial role in
this form of social evolution and the experience of the ASEAN regional
community, increasingly a psychological construct exhibiting noninstrumental features, lends solid support to this conception of interstate
collaboration.150
The 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis has seriously dented,
although has not necessarily eliminated, the credibility of those two
theoretical frameworks.151 The crisis unambiguously demonstrated that the

146. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 422 (“For liberal institutionalists
cooperation and institution-building thus became the new paradigms in the study of
international relations in Southeast Asia.”).
147. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 422–23 (arguing the economic boom
and the end of the cold war has generated new opportunities for cooperation in Southeast
Asia).
148. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 423 (“While realism and
institutionalism are committed to rationalism, constructivists share a reflexivist concept of
science . . . [t]heir key concern is the relationship between ideas, identities, and material
interests, which change through interaction of agents (states) and structure.”).
149. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 423 (discussing how constructivists
are concerned with internal rather than external processes).
150. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 422 (“It was believed that commonly
accepted principles and norms in security cooperation, growing market-driven economic
interdependencies, and the rise of epistemic communities created favorable conditions for
spillovers into new areas of cooperation.”).
151. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 422–23 (arguing that the Asian
financial crisis casts doubt on institutionalism frameworks, but that it did not render them
irrelevant).
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obituaries for realism have been premature.152 The crisis has also vividly
shown that liberal institutionalism and its constructivist counterpart have
failed to take proper account of reversals in integration, and in communityformation, due to cross-border cooperation often being a non-linear process,
or one prone to symptoms of decay, retrenchment, and spillback (the term
Eursosclerosis has been invoked to epitomize this phenomenon).153
The crisis, which was an analytically telling politico-economic
episode, has not led to an unqualified revival of realist thought and the
demise of institutionalist formulations.154 Instead, when the events of the
previous three decades have been reassessed, a tenuous compromise has
emerged, stipulating that the various schools “not only coexist in a dualtrack strategy, but in many instances are closely intertwined.”155 The
corollary is that the “[f]oreign policy of ASEAN [S]tates must . . . be
understood as a mix of realist and institutionalist elements changing
according to circumstances,”156 although the uncertainty regarding the
properties of the underlying dynamics has not been dispelled.157
Such theoretical soul-searching, which is ongoing and inconclusive,
is not confined to the Southeast Asian space. It has been witnessed in the
field of international law at least since Henkin addressed comprehensively
the issue of how nations behave or, to express it differently, why they create
and maintain international legal regimes.158 The particular explanation he
offered, which reflected a benign view of State conduct and the prevailing
world order, has not been embraced by all students of international law.159
Some have shared his sanguine outlook, typically those on the normative

152. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 423 (“The Asian crisis is an invitation
to revisit the theoretical arguments exchanged in the last decade . . . [some argue] that the
institutional and constructivist requiems for realism were premature.”).
153. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 423 (“Institutional approaches, for
instance, have failed to take into account integration reversals.”).
154. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 424 (“Foreign policy of ASEAN
states must thus be understood as a mix of realist and institutionalist elements changing
according to the circumstances.”).
155. Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 424.
156. Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 424.
157. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 424 (discussing how the Asian
financial crisis has stirred up debate for new institutionalist policies and created uncertainty
over where the balance between realist and institutionalist frameworks currently stands).
158. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY
10–11 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that compliance with international law is the result of nations
observing norms in support of an orderly society).
159. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L.J. 1935, 2025 (2002) (acknowledging that the human rights treaty compliance is dependent
on self-reporting and threats to reputation; however, these monitoring systems have proven
woefully ineffective).
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side of the analytical divide, but others have adopted a more skeptical
stance.160
The latter, primarily scholars of a realist/neo-realist persuasion,
have not been driven to the sidelines in the post-Cold War era and have
gained further prominence following the publication of Goldsmith’s and
Posner’s seminal treatise on the fragile underpinnings of international legal
regimes (specifically the issue of compliance, which is the principal focus
of the work surveyed here).161 They have argued emphatically that
“international law emerges from [S]tates acting rationally to maximize their
interests, given their perceptions of the interests of other [S]tates and the
distribution of [S]tate power”162 and have sought to demonstrate
conceptually, as well as empirically (by providing relevant illustrations),
the validity of this assertion.163
International collaboration, to the extent that it materializes and
possesses legal attributes, thus inevitably rests on modest foundations. It is
commonly the product of a narrow coincidence of interests, coordination
patterns marked by higher payoffs from identical or symmetrical strategies
than from any alternatives, and willingness to sacrifice short-term benefits
160. See generally id. (concluding that ratification of the treaties by individual countries
is more commonly used to offset pressure for change in human rights practice than to
augment it); Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory
Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 439–40 (2000) (concluding that one must
look beyond compliance to see the benefits of international law); Kal Raustiala & AnneMarie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 538–58 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (surveying
the study of compliance in international relations and international law); William C.
Bradford, International Legal Compliance: Surveying the Field, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 495,
495–536 (2005) (annotating the legal debate between legalization theorists who believe that
international law, on its own, affects states and their critics who believe that international
law remains purely aspirational); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (2005) (arguing that compliance with international law is a result
of states pursuing their own self interest); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 211–18 (2008) (arguing that an international law
violation can generate costs for states in three ways: reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation);
JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2008)
(“[I]nternational law is produced in order to allow states to achieve their preferences with
greater effectiveness through exchanges of authority . . . .”).
161. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 225 (“International law is a real
phenomenon but international law scholars exaggerate its power and significance . . . the
best explanation for when and why states comply with international law is . . . simply that
states act out of self-interest.”).
162. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 3.
163. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 13–14 (explaining that international
law emerges from states acting rationally to maximize their interest and that it can be
understood through the analysis of customary international law, treaties, and challenges to
the authors’ theory).
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in order to realize long-term advantages.164 Moreover, regimes are not
always the outcome of free initiative by the parties involved and may be the
result of coercion, which takes place “when a powerful [S]tate (or coalition
of [S]tates with convergent interests) forces weaker [S]tates to engage in
acts that are contrary to their interests (defined independently of the
coercion).”165
As indicated, the theoretical soundness and empirical robustness of
this portrayal is challenged by liberal institutionalists, international law
researchers, as well certain students of international relations.166 They do
not question the assumption that States may be conveniently regarded as
single entities and rational players that are attentive to the logic of selfcentered cost-benefit calculus.167 However, these challengers place greater
emphasis on interdependence among States in general, and in today’s
global environment in particular (given the prevalence of blurred roles and
permeable boundaries), highlighting the fact that choices by one party are
often contingent on those made by another and that this almost invariably is
the case in social settings characterized by strong inter-actor linkages (e.g.,
game of chicken and prisoner’s dilemma).168 Overlooking the welfare of
foreign States may consequently be a strategy detrimental to the interests of
players contently pursuing it, notably if the relationship is long-lasting in
nature (i.e., akin to a repeated game).169 By contrast, entering into
cooperative arrangements and sustaining them may be a relatively low-cost
proposition.170
The advantages and disadvantages of international cooperation are
balanced differently in liberal institutionalist accounts than in realist/neorealist ones.171 The absence of an overarching sovereign authority, posing
164. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 11–12 (arguing that state behavior
associated with international law can be explained by one of the four models including
coincidence of interest, coordination, cooperation, or coercion).
165. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 12.
166. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 8–9 (discussing the critiques of
rational choice theory by an array of scholars in related fields).
167. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 3–19
(3d ed. 2001) (explaining the theoretical frameworks of realism and institutionalism, and
discussing the relevance of rational players in a world increasingly influenced by nongovernmental actors).
168. See id. at 7 (“Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized
by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.”).
169. See Krasner, Structural Causes, supra note 9, at 11–12 (citing egoistic self-interest
as the most widely-accepted explanation underlying international regime theory).
170. See Krasner, Structural Causes, supra note 9, at 11–12 (discussing two
circumstances where freedom of choice provides an incentive to cooperate).
171. See Stephen Krasner, International Law and International Relations: Together,
Apart, Together?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 93 (2000) (highlighting the differences between
liberalism and realism in the context of international regime theory).
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the risk of anarchy, is a theme pervading both schools of thought.172 The
highly decentralized world order makes it attractive and easy for States to
refrain from undertaking collective obligations and not to respect their
commitments.173 To make matters worse, a single State may free-ride on
international accords, obtaining the benefits generated in the process
without incurring any material costs.174 Realists/neo-realists aim to counter
this propensity through power politics, but within the liberal institutionalist
framework the appreciation of the implications of interdependencies in a
loosely-structured and volatile global system prompts States to collaborate
with a view to maximizing mutual gains and minimizing the fallout from
self-centered adaptation.175
ASEAN-style cross-border bridge-building is a key tool employed
to that end. Intricate organizational mechanisms are devised to perform a
range of stability-promoting functions such as increasing transparency,
reducing the transaction costs of cooperation, monitoring compliance,
pursuing enforcement, and preventing deception.176 The institutions that
result from this collective endeavor are “social practices consisting of easily
recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing
relations among the occupants of these roles.”177 The rules that link the
latter “encompass sets of rights or entitlements . . . as well as sets of
behavioral prescriptions.”178
International law scholars typically provide generalizations about
State conduct predicated on the premise that it is driven by deliberate
choices inspired by either normative or utilitarian considerations.179 The
difference between the rationalist perspectives of realists/neo-realists and
liberal institutionalists lies not in the willingness, or lack thereof, to
172. See generally id. (comparing the realist focus on anarchical power relations with
the liberal drive towards institutionalism).
173. See id. at 94 (explaining the importance of unequal bargaining power between
states to both realist and liberal philosophies).
174. See KATE O’NEILL, THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10 (2009)
(“Thus, a single state can free-ride on an international agreement, and receive the benefits
from it without paying any costs of adjustment.”).
175. See GERRY NAGTZAAM, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATIES: NEOLIBERAL AND CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSES OF NORMATIVE EVOLUTION 30
(2009) (“States are ‘rational egoists’, who generally wish to maximize their gains from any
transaction, while minimizing costs.”).
176. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 11 (discussing
various predominant types of international regimes).
177. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 5.
178. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 5.
179. Such choices may of course be subject to various constraints. See generally
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (explaining the propensity of states to
comply with international obligations).
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embrace economic-style reasoning but in the value attached to
collaboration.180 Normative approaches, which are less relevant in the
ASEAN context, deny the merits of utilitarian reasoning, but do not
necessarily reject the hypothesis that, for all intents and purposes, States
operate as unitary actors.181
Transnational legal process theory (TLPT), a distinctly
constructivist analytical strand in the conceptually fragmented international
law space, is not wedded to the notion of methodical deliberation or the
idea of State centrality/cohesion.182 According to this school of thought, the
creation and maintenance of an international legal regime is not the product
of static adaptation to prevailing norms or the mechanistic application of
cost-benefit calculus but the result of ongoing interaction among a
multiplicity of players, some public/State and some private/non-State (e.g.,
Southeast Asian non-governmental organizations/NGOs),183 some countryspecific and some international (e.g., ASEAN Secretariat).184
180. See Krasner, supra note 171, at 95 (citing cooperation as the defining core of
liberalism).
181. See NAGTZAAM, supra note 255, at 30 (discussing the normative approach).
182. See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 181–83
(1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational] (“[Transnational legal process] is nonstatist: the
actors in this process are not just, or even primarily, nation-states, but include nonstate actors
as well.”).
183. See JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Placing Human Rights and Environmental Issues on
ASEAN’s Agenda: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations, 8 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 17,
17 (2000) (“However, [NGO] success in forming both domestic and regional networks,
some of which have even included government officials, has enabled them to successfully
place human rights and environmental issues on the agenda of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN).”); PETER BOOMGAARD, SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN ENVIRONMENTAL
HISTORY 325–26 (2007) (“For various reasons, environmental NGOs have often enjoyed
greater latitude under the autocratic regimes of Southeast Asia than other organizations with
critical views, partly because even dictatorial regimes wanted to look ‘modern’ in the eyes of
the world by appearing to be alive to environmental concerns.”).
184. See generally Koh, Transnational, supra note 182 (arguing that transnational legal
process has been the dominant mode of international legal scholarship for the past few
decades); Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey] (asserting that incorporation of international
norms into domestic legal systems is key to understanding why nations obey international
law); Harold H. Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397
(1999) [hereinafter Koh, International Human Rights] (arguing that human rights law is
enforced by individual interaction, interpretation, and internationalization in the
transnational context); Mary E. O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 334, 339 (1999) (“The resulting new ILP, therefore, would advocate knowledge of
the legal system and valuing institutional settlement in line with international society’s
values, to resolve society’s rapidly expanding issues.”); Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope,
International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International
Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19 (2000) (positing that international law is more widely
accepted when it is created through interactions among a wide range of state participants);
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From that standpoint, participation in a complex, demanding, and
lengthy process such as the formation of a regional community is a learning
experience, or a type of socialization undergone by the actors involved,
during which their identities are reconfigured and they internalize and
implement collective values such as those underpinning the ASEAN
Way.185 This is not a symmetric pattern. The causal impulses tend to travel
through channels that link international sources with domestic targets, not
the other way around.186 A number of socialization agents play a key role in
this apparently productive and essentially open-ended cognitive and
behavioral adjustment (e.g., bureaucratic procedures, governmental norm
sponsors, issue linkages, interpretive communities, law-declaring forums,
transnational issue networks, and transnational norms entrepreneurs).187
As noted, constructivist frameworks such as TLPT hold
considerable appeal for researchers who dissect ASEAN’s evolution.188 The
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES (Michael
Likosky ed., 2002) (“Few would dispute that many of the legal relationships and processes
occur within a transnational social context marked by power disparities—inequalities among
states, international institutions, transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations,
peoples, persons . . . .”); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (arguing
for the efficacy of international government networks); HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 5 (Richard P. Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 2006)
(“The field of international human rights has achieved a comprehensive and elevated global
quality of preferred world public policy . . . [i]t supplies a framework for a world order of
human dignity.”); Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International
Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64 (2006) (arguing that international legal process is best viewed as
a non-empirical framework).
185. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing the
socializing effects of international cooperation).
186. See Koh, Transnational, supra note 182, at 183 (“Transnational legal process
describes the theory and practice of how public and private actors . . . interact in a variety of
public and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and
ultimately, internalize rules of rules of transnational law.”).
187. See Koh, Transnational, supra note 182, at 183 (discussing how transnational
legal process forces states to internalize rules of transnational law); Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey, supra note 184, at 2599 (“A transnational actor’s moral obligation to obey an
international norm becomes an internally binding domestic legal obligation when that norm
has been interpreted and internalized into its domestic legal system.”); Koh, International
Human Rights, supra note 184, at 1399 (arguing that transnational legal process involves
interaction, interpretation, and internalization); SLAUGHTER, supra note 184, at 1–35
(arguing that traditional state institutions have become more international in nature);
ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 17–53 (discussing
constructivist notions regarding the interplay of norms and identities in the development of
security communities); NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 152 (discussing the influence of
ASEAN’S haze regime on domestic legal institutions).
188. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 26
(“While all theories of international organization, including neo-liberal institutionalism,
recognize the importance of norms, constructivism allows for a much deeper understanding
of norms in shaping international relations.”).
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organization has overcome several challenges and has proceeded to develop
new capabilities.189 It is tempting to argue that it is more than a narrow
instrumental vehicle and that it possesses an identity which transcends
national boundaries. The process of cognitive transformation is ongoing,
but it seems to be in advanced stages.190 However, this favorable
assessment continues to be questioned and realist/neo-realist skepticism
keeps on resurfacing.191 Additional theoretical insights, ASEAN-related and
broader in scope, may thus be generated by exploring relevant trends in
specific domains such as cross-border ecological cooperation.
IV. Combating Transboundary Haze Pollution
Asia has made enormous economic strides in the post-Second
World War era, albeit not uniformly so, and the Southeast Asian core has
been no exception to the rule.192 Yet, as the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) observes in its incisive and wide-ranging survey, the modernization
process has proceeded in an uneven fashion.193 Large-scale wealth creation
has been accompanied by heightened inequalities and worrisome
persistence of poverty.194 Unemployment and underemployment have also
remained relatively elevated in the wake of the 1997/98 financial crisis and
subsequent exogenous shocks.195 Last but not least, the negative
externalities stemming from unfettered output expansion, notably in the
form of environmental degradation, have proved costly.196 To express it
differently, economic growth has been generally impressive, but not
sufficiently inclusive.197
189. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 5
(pinpointing to a number of major crises that ASEAN has overcome since its formation in
1967).
190. See ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY, supra note 70, at 7
(discussing continued ASEAN efforts to reform itself and bring nations like China and India
into its normative framework for regional order).
191. See Rüland, Asian Crisis, supra note 136, at 443 (arguing that ASEAN’s policy
actions skew closer to realist theories than other competing theories).
192. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at v–vii (explaining the
importance of subregional cooperation in the creation of an Asian economic superpower).
193. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 200–33 (highlighting the slow
drive of modernization in some areas).
194. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 200–33 (outlining the
persistence of poverty in some subregions despite overall economic growth).
195. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 200–33 (discussing the
persistence of unemployment following the financial crisis of 1997/98).
196. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 200–33 (elaborating on the
continued environmental degradation in the face of economic expansion).
197. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 200–33 (detailing the
persistence of poverty in some subregions despite overall economic growth).
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Southeast Asia has long confronted a plethora of ecological
problems to which policy responses have traditionally been marked by
inertia and reticence.198 This pattern has been attributed to the priority
structure highlighted earlier (i.e., strong bias toward national security and
material well-being) and the tendency of the region’s developmental States
to ally themselves closely with corporate interests, also outlined
previously.199 However, governments have reacted, belatedly and
selectively, but neither fleetingly nor superficially, as crises erupted and
environmental consciousness has intensified.200 Their responses have
commonly followed a wave-like pattern.201
The first significant wave materialized in the early 1970s shortly
following the establishment of ASEAN, coinciding with the 1972
Stockholm United Nations Conference on the Environment, which may
have served as an attitudinal change agent and a catalyst for policy
reorientation, at least at the margin.202 The most palpable manifestation of a
growing sense of ecological urgency was the formation of ministries for the
environment at the central and, in some cases, sub-national government
level (in federal States such as Malaysia).203 Subsequent waves have
ensued, reflecting an increasing appreciation of the trade-offs between
wealth maximization and ecological preservation.204
It may thus be argued that the evolution of ASEAN has taken place
against the backdrop of progressively greater environmental activism both
on the domestic front and in the global arena, the emergence of strong
ecological protagonists (e.g., the ADB and the World Bank), and broad
cognitive readjustment conducive to a rebalancing of priorities, however

198. See James Clad & Aurora Medina Siy, The Emergence of Ecological Issues in
Southeast Asia, in SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
A DYNAMIC REGION 52, 52 (David Wurfel & Bruce Burton eds., 1996) [hereinafter Clad &
Siy] (“Much analysis of the environmental issues confronting Southeast Asia turns on the
apparent intractability of political and economic elites reacting to the new environmental
agenda.”).
199. See id. at 53 (explaining the prevalent theories of elite-driven resource
exploitation).
200. See id. at 54–55 (discussing the episodic, crisis-based nature of Southeast Asian
environmental response).
201. See id. at 60–65 (detailing the various waves of environmental awareness in
Southeast Asia).
202. See id. at 61 (“The first wave of environmental awareness in Southeast Asia
crested in the 1970s, following the 1972 Stockholm UN Conference on the Environment.”).
203. See id. at 61 (“Nearly all the current member of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) created ministries of the environment at the central and, as within
the Malaysian federation, at the state level as well.”).
204. See id. at 60–65 (discussing subsequent waves of environmentalism, and the shift
in perception evidenced therein).
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modest, in favor of environmental preservation.205 The confluence of these
mutually-reinforcing factors has inevitably shifted the organization in a
more ecologically-friendly direction that had been the case before the
1970s/1980s (1980s being more important in this respect in that the extent
and strength of the second wave, which gathered momentum during this
period, exceeded that of the 1970s).206
Policy adaptation, on a limited scale and with a lag, to such
exogenous trends has been most noticeable and productive within, rather
than across, national boundaries.207 The decision to address ecological
strains through ministerial-level organizational structures, referred to above,
is merely one example of the steps taken by individual ASEAN members to
arrest environmental degradation.208 From the 1970s/1980s onward, they
have proceeded in a generally incremental and patch-like fashion, but some
more decisively and swiftly than others, to enact an array of laws pertaining
to ecological preservation and natural resource management, to enhance
institutional capabilities necessary to support balanced development, and to
ratify relevant international conventions.209
However, this has not been a purely national endeavor. As amply
documented, collective initiatives have not been lacking, although again
they may have been the product of incremental and patch-like build-up.210
For instance, region-wide organizational mechanisms such as the ASEAN
Expert Group on the Environment (AEGE) and ASEAN Senior Officials on
the Environment (ASOEN) have been created.211 The latter, which has
205. See id. at 66 (detailing efforts made by the World Bank and ADB to introduce
green initiatives in its project-funding).
206. See id. at 61 (“The second wave of environmentalism, stronger than its antecedent,
emerged during the 1980s and continues today.”).
207. See id. at 70 (“Nevertheless, a domestic political commitment to environmental
protection is increasing in the region, largely an aggregate of a myriad of incremental
responses to local controversies and complaints.”).
208. See id. at 61 (discussing the creation of ministries in the overall context of regional
environmental efforts).
209. See Alan K. J. Tan, Environmental Laws and Institutions in Southeast Asia: A
Review of Recent Developments, 8 SING. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 177, 177 (2004) (“In Southeast
Asia, as elsewhere, national governments have sought to meet such challenges
by . . . enacting new laws on natural resource management and environmental protection,
ratifying relevant international conventions as well as establishing and strengthening the
requisite institutions for ecological governance.”).
210. See generally SELECTED ASEAN DOCUMENTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT (K.L. Koh,
ed., 1996) (providing a number of environmental accords, agreements, and plans of action);
1 ASEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND GOVERNANCE: SELECTED DOCUMENTS (K.L.
Koh ed., 2009) (submitting a chronological selection of ASEAN environmental documents
trending towards regional integration).
211. See ESCAP Virtual Conference, Regional/Sub-regional Coordination Related to
the Environment, http://www.unescap.org/drpad/vc/orientation/m3anx_asean_int.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2012) (describing the establishment and operation of ASEAN’s institutional

140

4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 103 (2013)

succeeded the former, meets annually and is responsible for the
formulation, implementation, and monitoring of programs geared toward
ecological preservation.212 It pursues its mission through Working Groups
on Nature Conservation and Biodiversity (AWGNCB), Coastal and Marine
Environment (AWGCME), and Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(AWGMEA), as well as a Haze Technical Task Force (HTTF).213 A formal
thrice-yearly ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME)
serves a broadly similar function at more strategic level (informal meetings
are typically held on an annual basis).214 In addition, the ASEAN
Secretariat is engaged in cross-border coordination in an ongoing
manner.215
Through these and parallel channels (e.g., ASEAN Heads of
Government/AHG), several ecologically-oriented collective plans have
been devised.216 They include regional and sub-regional blueprints/tools
such as a Policy Framework for Environmental Cooperation in ASEAN,
Environmental Objectives and Strategies in ASEAN, Environmental
Programs and Activities in ASEAN, Ministerial Declaration on the
Environment, ASEAN Environmental Programs, ASEAN Strategic Plan of
Action on the Environment, Hanoi Plan of Action, ASEAN Cooperative
Plan on Transboundary Pollution, ASEAN Regional Haze Plan, and
ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation.217
However, that is another policy domain where the depth of crossborder cooperation and its effectiveness is shrouded in controversy. An
elaborate institutional infrastructure appears to have been constructed and it
seems to be functioning adequately, as evidenced by the range of outputs
consistently produced. Nevertheless, doubts continue to be expressed about
members’ strategic commitment, organizational robustness, and policy
impact (a broader and more meaningful criterion than output).218 There is a
need for additional research in order to obtain a clearer picture of ASEAN
realities in this particular sphere and their theoretical ramifications.

environmental structure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate
and the Environment).
212. See id. (detailing the annual meeting protocol of ASOEN).
213. See id. (outlining the three Working Groups established under ASOEN).
214. See id. (explaining the purpose and meeting protocol of AMME).
215. See id. (mapping out an organizational structure of involved parties).
216. See id. (listing the major established ASEAN policies and programs on the
environment).
217. See id. (describing the establishment and operation of ASEAN’s institutional
environmental structure).
218. See generally Lorraine Elliott, ASEAN and Environmental Cooperation: Norms,
Interests and Identity, 16 PAC. REV. 29 (2003) (arguing against the effectiveness of ASEAN
environmental initiatives).
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Relevant academic work offering considerable analytical potential
and policy lessons has focused primarily on the massive Southeast Asian
forest fires and the severe haze accompanying them.219 The problem is
decades-old and has Indonesian origins, but it has escalated dramatically
and has assumed regional proportions in the 1990s and beyond.220 It mostly
stems from the practice of large businesses, in two agro industries, palm oil
and timber, to clear land by fire rather than rely on cheaper and less
ecologically disruptive alternatives.221 The tendency of small-scale
indigenous farmers to resort to traditional slash-and-burn methods for
similar purposes, coupled with land development schemes and weatherrelated phenomena such as El Nino, has aggravated the situation.222
The physical and economic consequences of these persistent
patterns of activity have been decidedly adverse.223 They have led to vast
deforestation; haze-induced (predominantly respiratory, but also
cardiovascular and dermatological) ailments, both short- and long-term
(potentially terminal); serious famine, which has resulted in
malnourishment and even death; widespread damage to biodiversity; and
significant acceleration/ deterioration in climate change and global
warming.224 Paradoxically, given the underlying causes, the economic costs
have been enormous, not merely due to the harm to the environment and
219. See generally Simon S.C. Tay, South East Asian Forest Fires: Haze over ASEAN
and International Environmental Law, 7 REV. OF EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 202 (1998)
[hereinafter Tay] (arguing for a more coordinated international effort to secure a sustainable
future); Alan K.J. Tan, Forest Fires of Indonesia: State Responsibility and International
Liability, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 826 (1999) (arguing that Indonesia should be held
responsible for the forest fires of 1997); James Cotton, The “Haze” Over Southeast Asia:
Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement, 72 PAC. AFF. 331 (1999) (citing the
haze crisis as evidence of ASEAN’s structural failings); Simon S.C. Tay, Southeast Asian
Fires: The Challenge for International Environmental Law and Sustainable Development,
11 GEO. J. INT’L L. 241 (1999) [hereinafter Tay, Southeast Asian Fires] (proffering
international sustainable development solutions as the most important way forward
following the fires); David S. Jones, ASEAN Initiatives to Combat Haze Pollution: An
Assessment of Regional Cooperation in Public Policy-Making, 12 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 59
(2004) (arguing for more accountability and regional oversight in Southeast Asia).
220. See Alan K. J. Tan, supra note 219, at 826 (discussing the region-wide spread of
haze in the 1990s).
221. See Alan K. J. Tan, supra note 219, at 854 (criticizing Indonesia’s failure to
regulate the actions of its citizens burning forests for profit).
222. See Alan K. J. Tan, supra note 219, at 842 (“The cumulative force of Indonesia’s
knowledge . . . relating to the deliberate burning practices of large commercial
concerns . . . established a clear obligation on Indonesia’s part to take concrete and effective
measures to prevent transboundary harm before this was occasioned.”).
223. See Alan K. J. Tan, supra note 219, at 826–28 (discussing the consequences, both
physical and economical, of the ‘slash-and-burn’ method).
224. See Alan K. J. Tan, supra note 219, at 827 (detailing the many adverse effects of
the ‘slash-and-burn’ method).
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human health/life, but also on account of the dislocation experienced by
industries such as farming, food, forestry, construction, air travel, and
tourism.225
Inevitably, Indonesian society—the principal source of these
ecological malpractices and shocks—has borne the brunt of the physical
devastation and has paid the heaviest economic price.226 However, given its
geographical scale and the force of its impact, the problem has had
substantial regional, and even international, repercussions.227 Neighboring
countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore, may have suffered most, but the
reverberations have been felt throughout Southeast Asia, adjacent areas,
and further afield (e.g., the late 1990s Indonesian eruption is estimated to
have released more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than the emissions
from the whole of Western Europe during the same period).228
ASEAN members indicated their awareness of the regional
spillovers already in the early 1990s.229 They initially conveyed their broad
concerns in the 1990 Kuala Lumpur Accord on the Environment and
Development, and subsequently proceeded to signal their commitment to
earnestly address cross-border ecological risks at meetings held in 1992 in
Singapore and in 1994 in Brunei and Malaysia.230 The last of these
225. See Tay, supra note 219, at 202–03 (describing the affects of the 1997 forest fires
on the country of Indonesia); Alan K. J. Tan, supra note 219, at 826–27 (discussing the
adverse affects on Indonesia and surrounding countries caused by the forest fires); Cotton,
supra note 219, at 331–33 (describing the affects of the 1997 forest fires on the Asian
community); Tay, Southeast Asian Fires, supra note 219, at 245–47 (describing the cost and
consequences of the forest fires of 1997); Jones, supra note 219, at 60–62 (describing the
extent and effect of forest burning in Indonesia); INDONESIA’S FIRES AND HAZE: THE COST OF
CATASTROPHE 7–12 (David Glover & Timothy Jessup eds., 2006) (describing the impact of
the 1997 fires on wildlife, people, land, etc.); ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, FIRE, SMOKE, AND
HAZE: THE ASEAN RESPONSE STRATEGY 44–54 (S. Tahir Qadri ed., 2001) (describing in
detail the effects of the 1997 forest fires on Indonesia); Miroslav Radojevic, Introduction to
FOREST FIRES AND REGIONAL HAZE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4–6 (Peter Eaton & Miroslav
Radojevic eds., 2001) (describing the effects of fires and haze); Graham Applegate et al.,
Forest Fires in Indonesia: Impacts and Solutions, in WHICH WAY FORWARD?: PEOPLE,
FORESTS, AND POLICYMAKING IN INDONESIA 293–308 (Carol J. Pierce & Ida A.P.
Resosudarmo eds., 2002) (describing the impact of the 1997 forest fires on Indonesia).
226. See Tay, supra note 219, at 203 (describing the effects of the 1997 forest fires on
the country of Indonesia).
227. See Tay, supra note 219, at 203 (describing the effects of the 1997 forest fires on
nearby countries).
228. See Tay, supra note 219, at 203 (discussing carbon dioxide emissions from 1997
forest fires in Indonesia); Tay, Southeast Asian Fires, supra note 219, at 247 (detailing the
impact of the 1997 forest fires).
229. See Jones, supra note 219, at 64 (showing the awareness of the problem by
regional leaders).
230. See Jones, supra note 219, at 64 (describing the leaders first meeting to discuss
this issue).
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meetings laid a foundation for the development of concrete monitoring and
response mechanisms, institutional and technical, for enhancing the
effectiveness of collective decision-making on that front, a process
extended further at a meeting specifically focused on the Management of
Transboundary Pollution which took place in 1995 and culminated in the
adoption of an ASEAN Cooperation Plan to tackle the problem.231
In the wake of the widespread forest burning and land destruction
in 1997, which severely aggravated haze conditions and side effects of
atmospheric pollution, ASEAN ministers of the environment formulated a
three-pronged strategy to intensify efforts to alleviate cross-border
ecological challenges.232 One element consisted of requirements to
implement, at the national level, specific measures to increase prevention,
surveillance, and mitigation of forest burning.233 The second aimed at
boosting the capacity of the ASEAN Meteorological Center, a technically
critical ingredient of the blueprint.234 The third was also geared toward
improving problem management, but through better transparency rather
upgrading of the scientific infrastructure.235 This was to be achieved by
providing a detailed inventory of resources available for fire-fighting
purposes.236
The Regional Action Plan (RAP) was not without concrete
benefits.237 It furnished a conceptual framework for combating
transboundary pollution by identifying the institutional and technical inputs
needed to be acquired methodically and activated collectively to that end
and the interrelationships among them.238 However, it constituted merely a
set of recommendations, not always detailed and unambiguous, to member
231. See Jones, supra note 219, at 64 (discussing the foundation of the meeting and
their successes).
232. See Jones, supra note 219, at 64–65 (illustrating the three part plan to combat
transboundary pollution from the Indonesian fires).
233. See Jones, supra note 219, at 64–65 (explaining how the first part of the plan
requires member states to draw up national plans to monitor, prevent, deter and mitigate
forest burning).
234.See Jones, supra note 219, at 65 (describing the second part of the plan which sought to
strengthen the monitoring system for land fires and increased pollution levels).
235. See Jones, supra note 219, at 65 (providing a description of the third part of the
plan).
236. See Jones, supra note 219, at 65 (examining in detail the third part of the plan
which required nations to codify a list of resources, expertise, and procedures for
firefighting).
237. See Jones, supra note 219, at 65 (discussing the contributions of the plan, for
example the establishment of Sub-regional Fire Fighting Arrangement (SRFAS) for Borneo
and Sumatra, the creation of a SRFAS Legal Group, expanding the monitoring system at the
regional level, and providing a useful blueprint for prevention, enforcement, and mitigation).
238. See Jones, supra note 219, at 65 (describing the arrangements set up to increase
communication and collaboration between the ASEAN countries).
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States, leaving it to national governments to decide whether to embrace
them, to what extent, and at what pace.239 RAP thus had no material impact
on the frequency, scale, and consequences of major subsequent forest
burning episodes.240
Its limitations and the modest dimensions of preceding initiatives
notwithstanding, RAP and related steps can be said to have paved the way
for the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP),
which was signed by relevant parties in 2002 and came into effect in the
following year.241 Unlike previous policy statements and actions, AATHP is
a formal international treaty.242 As such, it is characterized by greater
breadth, definitional clarity, elaboration, and structural coherence than
high-level informal understandings.243 By the same token, AATHP’s
viability does not hinge on the goodwill, or voluntary adherence, of States
because, by virtue of its legal status, it imposes specific obligations on
signatories and requires them to scrupulously comply with its provisions.244
The adoption of AATHP has been hailed as a manifestation of
ASEAN’s determination to confront cross-border pollution in a
significantly more organized and productive fashion than in the past.245 The
willingness to resort to an international treaty for this purpose has been
viewed as particularly noteworthy, given members traditionally deep
aversion to any dilution of sovereign power and binding dispute settlement
mechanisms.246 The adoption of AATHP could thus been seen as ushering
in a new era, marked by “the assertion of legal rights in place of mere
persuasion and consultation . . .” especially in circumstances where “the
interests of [S]tates are materially damaged.”247
239. See Jones, supra note 219, at 65 (explaining that countries could choose to opt out
of any of the regulations in the plan and there was no deadline for implementation).
240. See Jones, supra note 219, at 65 (pinpointing to the widespread forest and land
fires that took place even after the plan was in place).
241. See Jones, supra note 219, at 66 (discussing how the culmination of the previous
plan helped create the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution which extends
the reach of previous measures and gives legal force under international law).
242. See Jones, supra note 219, at 66 (examining the international legal nature of the
document).
243. See Jones, supra note 219, at 66 (illustrating the fact that the treaty is a huge
improvement on previous informal agreements).
244. See generally Alan K. J. Tan, The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze
Pollution: Prospects for Compliance and Effectiveness in Post-Suharto Indonesia, 13
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 647, 649 (2005) [hereinafter Tan, The ASEAN Agreement] (describing
the optimists view of the treaty).
245. See id. (elaborating on the adoption of the new treaty).
246. See id. (indicating the previously adverse attitude of the Asian countries to the idea
of an international treaty).
247. Id. (explaining that the treaty is a significant improvement from previous
agreements in the Asian region).
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However, again, this apparent institutional leap forward has fallen
well short of delivering a collective platform for genuinely effective
problem alleviation.248 Importantly, not all ASEAN members have chosen
to ratify the Agreement.249 Indonesia has been the most glaring absentee in
that, without its active participation, the new governance regime could not
function adequately.250 What amounted to foot-dragging (by Cambodia and
the Philippines as well) was initially attributed to bottlenecks and
inefficiencies in the executive and legislative processes in the countries
involved.251 The issue of capacity constraints has also been invoked, and to
some extent legitimately so, since implementing AATHP in its entirety may
have been, organizationally and technically, beyond the ability of resourcepoor and severely challenged countries.252
A case in point, which lends support to the second argument, is the
pervasive fragmentation of the environmental management system in
Indonesia.253 The problem has two principal dimensions.254 At the central
government level, multiple bureaucratic entities perform vaguely delineated
and overlapping functions with virtually no coordination and synchronized
planning.255 In addition, far-reaching administrative decentralization has
rendered them effectively impotent vis-a-vis the plethora of largely
autonomous sub-national units engaged in activities which impinge on
ecological governance.256 The corollary is that the country may not be in a
248. See id. (describing the shortfalls of the agreement such as the lack of state
accountability and enforceable provisions).
249. See id. at 648 (discussing the original members of the treaty such as Singapore,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Brunei, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic).
250. See id. (examining the noticeable absence of Indonesia from the treaty, who is the
largest source of the forest fires).
251. See Jones, supra note 219, at 68 (providing a detailed explanation of the
agreement’s formation).
252. See Jones, supra note 219, at 69 (describing the difficulty of implementing policy
and the deficiencies of the Indonesian environmental controls); Tan, The ASEAN
Agreement, supra note 244, at 657 (discussing the effectiveness in implementing the treaty).
253. See Jones, supra note 219, at 69–70 (examining the environmental agencies in
Indonesia); Alan K. J. Tan, supra note 219, at 671–75 (providing an overview of the
deficient institutional structure of Indonesia).
254.
See Tan, The ASEAN Agreement, supra note 244, at 672 (illustrating the
problems with Indonesia’s institutional structure).
255. See Jones, supra note 219, at 70 (discussing the numerous organizations in charge
of similar activities with no chain of command or accountability); Tan, The ASEAN
Agreement, supra note 244, at 672–75 (examining the inadequate coordinate between
institutions).
256. See Jones, supra note 219, at 69–70 (pinpointing to the decentralization of
government in Indonesia that backfired because it made enforcement more difficult); Tan,
The ASEAN Agreement, supra note 244, at 675 (showing the lack of coordination between
local and national environmental organizations).
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position to cooperate meaningfully with its neighbors in the environmental
domain, whatever its international commitments.257
However, it would be inappropriate to ascribe institutional delays,
inertia, and reticence to structural impediments and inadequate capabilities
alone. A detailed dissection of the AATHP reveals features indicative of a
“half-empty” legal “glass,” a pattern which may reflect a residual
reluctance on the part of ASEAN members to undertake obligations that
would substantially circumscribe their individual room for maneuver.258 An
elaborate examination is beyond the scope of this paper, but attention may
be drawn to concessions to State sovereignty, insufficient terminological
precision, non-binding elements, and weakness of provisions relating to
deterrence and enforcement (including dispute resolution).259 While by no
means a failure, the fact that the regime still cannot be portrayed as a fully
collaborative venture arguably calls for a recalibration of competing
theoretical models widely relied upon to explain the creation and
development of international governance systems, in general and in the
ecological realm in particular.260
V. Limitations of the Realist-Institutionalist Dichotomy
In endeavoring to come to grips with complex ASEAN realities, it
is common to highlight the differences between this partially-integrated
regional grouping and the EU. It is said that the latter’s inherently
supranational, rule-based structure is a configuration which the former may

257. See Jones, supra note 219, at 69–70 (concluding that Indonesia may not be in a
place to help itself, let alone other countries).
258. See Jones, supra note 219, at 67–68 (analyzing the agreement and discussing the
shortfalls such as the imprecise language which may lead to differences of interpretation and
allow parties to defeat the intent underlying those provisions); Tan, The ASEAN Agreement,
supra note 244, at 663–64 (discussing the general obligations of the treaty and although no
penalties are listed the provisions are broad and should encourage enforcement); see also
Md. Saiful Karim, Future of the Haze Agreement—Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 38
ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 328, 329–31 (2008) (discussing the future of the agreement and how it
can be successfully implemented); Koh Kheng-Lian, A Breakthrough in Solving the
Indonesian Haze?, in SHARED RESOURCES: ISSUES OF GOVERNANCE 225, 231–35 (Sharelle
Hart ed., 2008) (evaluating the ATHP); Ebinezer R. Florano, Assessment of the “Strengths”
of the New ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, 4 INT’L REV. FOR ENVTL.
STRATEGIES 127, 142 (2003) (comparing the ATHP with other environmental treaties).
259. See Jones, supra note 219, at 67–68 (examining the weaknesses of the ATHP);
Tan, The ASEAN Agreement, supra note 244, at 663–70 (discussing extensively the failures
of the treaty).
260. See Florano, supra note 258, at 143 (concluding that if the ATHP is not effective,
it must be redone).
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not be able to emulate.261 The reason is that divergent historical
circumstances (the Second World War) have undermined nationalism in
Europe, but decolonization has reinforced it in Southeast Asia, and
socioeconomic conditions militate against fusion on a similar scale.262
Indeed, building a truly united Europe is an EU strategic goal, whereas
ASEAN objectives are not as lofty.263
Nevertheless, regional cooperation in Southeast Asia cannot be
portrayed as a trivial phenomenon, whether from a longitudinal or a crosssectional perspective.264 There can be little doubt that ASEAN has matured
into a broad-based, strategically meaningful, and well-defined
organization.265 While it remains to be seen whether it fulfills its ambitious
collective agenda, ASEAN evidently seeks to transform itself into a
comprehensive regional community (but not a political union) and may
possibly realize its aspirations, albeit perhaps later rather than sooner.266
Moreover, while comparisons with the EU may be unflattering in this
respect, those with other regional groupings may paint a more favorable
picture.267
It is thus disconcerting that, following four and a half decades of
persistent institution building, and repeated attempts to jointly address acute
environmental problems, the proverbial ASEAN ecological glass is at best
half-full, or that the underpinnings of the governance regime do not qualify
as robust.268 On the face of it, the pattern observed is highly consistent with
realist/neo-realist perceptions of international legal behavior, and even
compellingly so because a small regional entity such as ASEAN should
provide a setting more conducive to collaboration/less favorable to shirking

261. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 241 (comparing ASEAN to the
EU).
262. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 241 (examining Europe and
Asia’s different approaches to regionalism).
263. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 240–42 (discussing the ASEAN
and EU structures and comparing the two); see also REGIONAL INTEGRATION—EUROPE AND
ASIA COMPARED 28–45 (Woosik Moon & Bernadette Andreosso O’Callaghan eds., 2005)
(examining both the Asian and European experiences and comparing their integration
processes).
264. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 243 (detailing the Asian model
or approach to regionalism).
265. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 244 (illustrating the strengths of
the Asian community).
266. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 245 (examining the
relationships between ASEAN countries and their model of a regional community).
267. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 245 (evaluating the growing
ASEAN region and their importance to the world economy and future).
268. See Tan, The ASEAN Agreement, supra note 244, at 672 (pinpointing to the
problems with Indonesia’s institutional structure and difficulty implementing the treaty).
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than larger ones.269 By the same token, environmental cooperation is
normally a moderate-cost/feasible proposition, at least in relative terms
(e.g., compared with the difficulties witnessed in the national security
domain).270
Normatively-inclined proponents of the managerial thesis might
argue that States such as Indonesia recognize the virtues of ecological
collaboration with their regional partners and are willing to assume the
necessary obligations, but that they refrain from proceeding decisively in
this direction because of organizational and technical frailties.271 However,
such claims are not entirely valid since the analytical practice of decoupling
government capacity from policy intention is somewhat questionable. The
former is a function of the latter, rather than a wholly independent factor.272
For example, there is nothing to prevent the Indonesian authorities from
confronting with greater determination the causes and symptoms of
excessive horizontal and vertical fragmentation of the country’s sprawling
bureaucratic apparatus.
The conceptual difficulties to which the realist/neo-realist approach
gives rise do not stem from the rationalism attributed to players in the
global arena as such, but from the assumption that States are unitary actors
driven by a coherent set of interests which are shared by those who control
the government machinery (which may diverge from the national interest,
public interest, and the like).273 Despite an acknowledgement that this
involves a degree of oversimplification, it is thus emphatically conveyed

269. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 23–43 (discussing the theory of
customary international law and the expressed skepticism about how often such cooperation
or coordination by custom really occurs, especially as the number of states increases).
270. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 85–88 (describing the logic of
international agreements specifically multilateral treaties and international organisations).
See generally George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News
About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 379–406 (1996) (arguing that international treaty
compliance is high and enforcement of the agreement plays little or no part in achieving that
end); Michael J. Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-Off in International Mutilateral
Agreements?, 58 INT’L ORG. 459, 459–84 (2004) (explaining that treaties with a small
number of members can have greater cooperation and integration than those with a large
number of members and argues that a new way of treaty making can solve that by having
States set their policies at different levels).
271. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 179, at 14–15, 25 (explaining that one of the
difficulties of implementing environmental treaties in developing countries is the lack of
capacity).
272. See Roda Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law in Transitional Settings:
The Chinese Experience, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 45, 92–94 (2008) (discussing the idea
that capacity issues is an obstacle in carrying out treaty obligations).
273. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 4 (explaining that States interests
are carried out by the political sphere).
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that “we give the [S]tate the starring role in our drama.”274 The reason lies
in the fact that “international law addresses itself to [S]tates and, for the
most part, not to individuals or other [similar] entities . . . .”275
This logic extends to the notion of interests which are equated with
“[S]tate preferences about outcomes.”276 It is recognized that these “are not
always easy to determine, because the [S]tate subsumes many institutions
and individuals that obviously do not share identical preferences about
outcomes.”277 Be that as it may, one may conveniently posit that “a
[S]tate—especially one with well-ordered political institutions—can make
coherent decisions based upon identifiable preferences, or interests, and it is
natural and common to explain [S]tate action on the international plane in
terms of the primary goal or goals the [S]tate seeks to achieve.”278 Given
the appeal of this reasoning, it is appropriate to equate “[S]tate interests in
connection with particular legal regimes by looking, based on many types
of evidence, to the preferences of the [S]tate’s political leadership.”279
However, the Indonesian experience as a participant in the
fledgling ASEAN environmental governance regime clearly suggests that
pursuing such a theoretical path may lead to a loss of valuable information
and may not be an entirely productive strategy.280 Treating domestic
politics, to all appearances the principal determinant of policy outcomes in
this case, including in the ecological domain, as the equivalent of a black
box is a methodological approach likely to yield partial and unsatisfactory
explanations.281 Indeed, one may legitimately contend that Indonesian
reluctance to engage fully in regional efforts to combat transboundary haze
pollution has not reflected the preferences of the country’s political

274. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 4 (describing the notion that individual
State interests influence treaty creation and negotiation).
275. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 5 (citing the entities that are involved in
treaty making).
276. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 6 (explaining how State interest is a
large factor during treaty development).
277. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 6 (highlighting that finding common
goals in a State with many institutions and views can be difficult).
278. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 6 (discussing the idea of finding a
common goal or goals can be difficult in States with many institutions, however, if the
country has strong political leadership this will help).
279. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 160, at 6 (illustrating that a State’s political
leadership, influenced by many opinions, makes the decision about international law).
280. See Cotton, supra note 219, at 342 (examining how Indonesia relied to heavily on
their domestic needs and not on the needs of the region).
281. See Cotton, supra note 219, at 342 (demonstrating that domestic priorities have
prevailed over the needs of the region with drastic consequences).
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leadership in the narrow sense of the term, but has been the product of
forces at home which have impeded closer cross-border cooperation.282
Indonesian domestic politics is a highly intricate affair.283 In the
environmental realm, the patrimonial, or patron-client model, has been
invoked to account for seriously deficient forestry practices.284 According to
this analytical construct, timber concessionaires have been holders of
benefices from the ruler, a type of transaction that has been the source of
complementary power, inevitably to the detriment of the general
population.285 Initially, this configuration deprived “the indigenes of the use
and enjoyment of the forest, and ordinary citizens of any revenues or
income from the timber trade, while creating an extralegal sphere beyond
the reach of normal [S]tate regulation.”286 Subsequently, “[t]he forestry
practices that arose in these circumstances . . . generated additional
expenses, in the form of haze and environmental degradation.”287
282. See Cotton, supra note 219, at 342 (elaborating on the lack of cooperation between
Indonesia and their fellow ASEAN members in combating haze from the 1997 fires).
283. See generally SAYED F. ALATAS, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN
INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA: THE RISE OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE (1997) (examining the
development of Mylasia as a democratic state with a authoritarian regime next door in
Indonesia); INST. OF SE. ASIAN STUD., PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATISATION IN INDONESIA:
ELECTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIETY (Edward Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner eds., 2010)
(presenting a study of the post authoritarian State of Indonesia); HAROLD CROUCH,
POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA AFTER SOEHARTO (2010) (discussing the success of
Indonesia in transitioning from the Soeharto regime to democracy).
284. See Cotton, supra note 219, at 339–40 (describing the patrimonial model used in
the timber industry which contributed to the failing environmental system).
285. See Cotton, supra note 219, at 340 (detailing the effects on the public due to
timber concessions).
286. Cotton, supra note 219, at 340.
287. Cotton, supra note 219, at 340. For additional insights see Anne Casson, The
Political Economy of Indonesia’s Oil Palm Subsector, in WHICH WAY FORWARD?: PEOPLE,
FORESTS, AND POLICYMAKING IN INDONESIA 221–45 (Carol J. Pierce & Ida A.P.
Resosudarmo eds., 2002) (recounting the responsibility of oil palm production for forest
fires and resulting haze, and the political incentives for expanding the sector in the future);
Richard G. Dudley, Dynamics of Illegal Logging in Indonesia, in WHICH WAY FORWARD?:
PEOPLE, FORESTS, AND POLICYMAKING IN INDONESIA 358–82 (Carol J. Pierce & Ida A.P.
Resosudarmo eds., 2002) (applying system dynamics modeling to analyze illegal logging
practices); NANCY LEE PELUSO, RICH FORESTS, POOR PEOPLE: RESOURCE CONTROL AND
RESISTANCE IN JAVA (1992) (chronicling the development of state forestry policy in Java and
attendant political and policy developments); Colin MacAndrews, Politics of the
Environment in Indonesia, 34 ASIAN SURV. 369, 369–80 (1994) (examining political and
interest groups’ uses of environmental issues in Indonesian politics); Mark Poffenberger,
Rethinking Indonesian Forest Policy: Beyond the Timber Barons, 37 ASIAN SURV. 453, 453–
69 (1997) (discussing the long-term political and ecological consequences of Indonesia’s
exploitative forest policies); Robert Cribb, Environmental Policy and Politics in Indonesia,
in ECOLOGICAL POLICY AND POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
DEMOCRACY, AND ENVIRONMENT 65, 65–85 (Uday Desai ed., 1998) (discussing the
environmental and policy consequences resulting from population pressure and postcolonial
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The ruler-centered patrimonial structure, exploited by timber
concessionaires by virtue of their ties with members of the president’s
family and the military, has given way in recent years to a more open and
transparent system.288 However, State capture by private interests is not a
thing of the past and remains a widespread phenomenon289 (manifesting
itself even in institutionally more-robust Asian settings).290 Gaining a
proper understanding of how these interests are organized, function, and
affect policy outcomes must be the first step in the conceptual process of
constructing a credible account of the evolution of the Indonesian
ecological governance regime and its relationships with its ASEAN
counterparts. Focusing on the State as an autonomous entity and the
preferences of its political leadership may not yield sufficiently illuminating
insights.

economic development); Euston Quah, Transboundary Pollution in Southeast Asia: The
Indonesian Fires, 30 WORLD DEV. 429, 429–41 (2002) (discussing the costs of
transboundary seasonal haze in southeast Asia and various potential policy responses);
Michael R. Dove, Forest Discourses in South and Southeast Asia: A Comparison with
Global Discourses, in NATURE IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS IN SOUTH
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 103, 103–23 (Paul Greenough & Anna L. Tsing eds., 2003)
(comparing critically linguistic and cultural conceptions of forests in Pakistan and
Indonesia); THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INDONESIA’S NATURAL RESOURCES (Budy P.
Resosudarmo ed., 2005) (reviewing Indonesia’s various environmental challenges in the
context of its political reforms); THE DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST GOVERNANCE: POLITICS,
ECONOMICS AND THE FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF FORESTS IN INDONESIAN BORNEO (Moira
Moeliono, Godwin Limberg & Eva Wollenberg eds., 2009) (collecting of essays on the
environmental effects of government decentralization and democratization reforms in
Indonesia); Hidayat Alhamid, Chris Ballard & Peter Kanowski, Forests for the People?
Special Autonomy, Community Forestry Cooperatives and the Apparent Return of
Customary Rights in Papua, in COMMUNITY, ENVIRONMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN
INDONESIA: LOCATING THE COMMONWEAL 145, 145–65 (Carol Warren & John F. McCarthy
eds., 2009) (reviewing forest management under indigenous customary authority in Papua
after the Indonesian government granted the province autonomy, and potential threats to
community sustainability that result).
288. See Budy P. Resosudarmo, Introduction to THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF
INDONESIA’S NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 287, at 3–4 (describing Indonesia’s political
evolution and rights to natural resources).
289. See Transparency Int’l, Money Politics and State Capture (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://www.ti.or.id/en/index.php/press-release/2010/11/11/money-politics-and-state-capture
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (reporting that 150 regents and mayors, and seventeen
governors, were jailed in Indonesia from 2005-2010 as a result of corruption) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate and the Environment).
290. See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Hong Kong’s
“Open Skies” Legal Regime: An Empirical and Theoretical Exploration, 10 SAN DIEGO
INT’L L.J. 381, 413–14 (2009) (discussing the ways regulation becomes skewed in favor of
private interests, with regulators coming to act as cartels or captured entities for private
interests’ benefit).
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The realization that diversity/heterogeneity, at home and abroad,
plays a key role in determining the development of international legal
systems is of course at the heart of TLPT.291 However, this theoretical
perspective does not delve deeply into domestic political territory and pays
scant attention to private interests.292 The crucial importance of those
factors is duly acknowledged elsewhere in the institutionalist space, and
attempts have been made to model their operation with a considerable
degree of precision.293 However, the tools proposed for this purpose are
better suited to dissecting specific decisions than complex processes that
extend over a long period of time,294 such as multi-year collaboration within
ASEAN.295
Indeed, it remains to be seen whether a single model may be
formulated to reflect the operation of domestic political forces and their
impact on international cooperation. Public choice theorists aspire to
achieve this objective and have made some progress on that front.296
291. See Koh, Transnational, supra note 182, at 184 (describing transnational legal
process as a dynamic activity that involves a broad group of actors, state and nonstate, to
produce new policy).
292. See Koh, Transnational, supra note 182, at 184 (noting that TLPT intentionally
mixes the domestic with the international, and the private with the public).
293. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political
Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L.
127, 127–58 (2010) (discussing the conditions in which domestic political coalitions may
form to produce compliance with international law); THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Miranda A. Schreurs & Elizabeth Economy eds., 1997)
(collecting case studies from various regions analyzing the effects of new transnational
political relationships on environmental policymaking). For additional insights, see
TRACHTMAN, supra note 162, at 22–24 (outlining various modeling approaches as applied to
analyze particular international law problems); Michael Zurn, Bringing the Second Image
(Back) In: About the Domestic Sources of Regime Formation, in REGIME THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 282–311 (using the internal characteristics and
domestic politics of state actors to explain international regime formation).
294. See generally Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of State
Accession to International Legal Regimes: A Re-Assessment of the China-World Trade
Organization Nexus, 10 J. INT’L TRADE L. & POL’Y 5, 5–28 (2011) (contrasting trade and
investment-based analyses with realist, institutionalist, and constructivist analyses, and
concluding that these approaches “are selectively rather than invariably relevant”).
295. See Yuen Foong Khong & Helen E. S. Nesadurai, Hanging Together, Institutional
Design, and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: AFTA and the ARF, in CRAFTING
COOPERATION: REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 32,
32–34 (Amitav Acharya & Alastair I. Johnston eds., 2007) (describing the extensive process
of ASEAN nations’ institutional evolution to cooperate more effectively).
296. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Enrico Colombatto, The Decline of the Nation
State and its Effect on Constitutional and International Economic Law: A Public Choice
Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 925–56 (1996) (applying public choice theory to explain
international agreements on insider trading and capital requirements for banks); Philip Jones,
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However, their parsimonious/stylized constructs may not be rich and
versatile enough to accommodate comfortably the diversity/heterogeneity
of the patterns dissected by students of comparative politics across the
globe (e.g., divergent domestic influences on regional collaboration in
Indonesia and Singapore).297 The ASEAN record highlights the significance
of the input into the environmental policy process of private interests firmly
entrenched in the corridors of power, as well as the need for further
research on the subject in order to do justice to the intricacies involved, but
without offering any broad and definitive answers.298 This is due to the fact
that the situation in Indonesia, the obvious regional outlier, has been
explored more intensively and methodically than in neighboring countries,
hampering across-the-board generalizations and production of typologies.299
The emphasis on domestic private interests should not obscure the
enduring relevance of State-centered realist/neo-realist models, at least in
this geographical context.300 It is apparent that ASEAN members
(developmental States) and political leaders throughout the region share a
common set of preferences that revolves around economic growth.301 The
consistent pursuit of this overarching goal yields an array of benefits for
elites, pivotal non-elite groups, and the masses.302 Environmental
preservation is looming larger on the policy agenda than during previous
phases of modernization, but its importance cannot be equated with that of

Taking Self-Interest into Account: A Public Choice Analysis of International Cooperation, in
THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE: RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 303, 304–24 (Inge Kaul &
Pedro Conceição eds., 2006) (analyzing the preferences of voters, lobbyists, politicians, and
bureaucrats to determine the effect of those preferences on international cooperation).
297. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 21 (noting Indonesia’s shift toward regional
cooperation after the military coup in 1965 and its fissure with Singapore due to Singapore’s
separation from Malaysia).
298. See generally Paul K. Gellert, Oligarchy in the Timber Markets of Indonesia:
From Apkindo to IBRA to the Future of the Forests, in THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF
INDONESIA’S NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 287, at 145–61 (describing the “capitalist
oligarchy” that arose from government patronage following Indonesia’s military coup).
299. See generally THE DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST GOVERNANCE: POLITICS,
ECONOMICS AND THE FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF FORESTS IN INDONESIAN BORNEO, supra note
287, at 3–298 (providing one collection of such analyses regarding Indonesia).
300. See Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note 294, at 15–16 (discussing the relevance of
realist theories in the context of Chinese cooperation with international trade organizations).
301. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 17–21 (“Asian opinion leaders
see regional economic relations as strongest in trade and investment . . . [but] believe that
governments are not sufficiently active in developing regional mechanisms for coping with
health, environmental, and other cross-border challenges.”).
302. See Nesadurai, supra note 295, at 43–46 (noting that elites depended on economic
growth and distribution to maintain popular support, and on economic privileges for allies to
maintain political harmony).
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wealth maximization.303 This partly (and only partly, not uniformly)
explains the persistent reluctance to countenance the prospect of a tight
region-wide regulatory regime for cross-border haze pollution.304
Macro-level, country-specific realist/neo-realist considerations may
have also exerted influence on that front, without necessarily qualifying as
the sole, or even dominant, factor in the equation.305 For instance,
Indonesia’s loss of two islands (Ligitan and Sipidan) to Malaysia in 2004,
coupled with the country’s desire to regain its status as a regional leader in
a nationalistic climate, may have been one of the reasons for a posture
entailing distance from ASEAN partners (while Indonesia, at the same time,
displayed a spirit of international collaboration by signaling a willingness to
ratify the Cartagena and Kyoto Protocols) and muscle-flexing vis-a-vis
Malaysia.306 This may be construed as an exercise in power politics by a
State driven by strategic interests.
The fundamentally realist/neo-realist interpretation of the evolution
of the ASEAN regime for transboundary haze pollution has recently been
challenged by an institutionalist scholar, who has skillfully highlighted the
liberal and constructivist dimensions of the picture.307 One argument put
forward is that the lack of a hegemonic power such as the U.S. in the
creation and maintenance of the system, which would ensure its stability,
implies that realist/neo-realist accounts are incomplete.308 However, the
notion of hegemonic governance is no longer an essential component of
realist/neo-realist formulations.309 Further, as the author concedes, and as
the above example illustrates, power politics has not been absent from

303. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 43–47 (contrasting the rise of sustainable
development as an ASEAN policy objective with the economic realities of resource
development).
304. See Jones, supra note 219, at 68–72 (blaming enforcement failures on a lack of
capacity in regulatory institutions and official corruption by business interests).
305. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 97–98 (describing several factors affecting
regional cooperation and noting that economic interests militated against Indonesian
involvement in a binding cooperative scheme).
306. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 95–96 (sketching the broader political
context in which decisions on ASEAN cooperation were made).
307. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 5–8 (outlining the book’s use of regime
theory, grounded in game theory and liberal international relations, and analysis of
normative structures, based on a constructivist approach to the “ASEAN way” principle).
308. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 6 (“Because a hegemonic power is absent
from ASEAN cooperation on the haze, the realist assumptions based on power-configuration
are irrelevant in this study.”).
309. See John M. Hobson, The ‘Second State Debate’ in International Relations:
Theory Turned Upside Down, 27 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 395, 405–06 (2001) (discussing
Robert Keohane’s treatment of hegemons as unnecessary preconditions for international
institutions).
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ASEAN’s quest for a regional mechanism to minimize the impact of forest
burning.310
This is a minor quibble, as the author amply documents the rise of a
system with many of the normative, legal, organizational, cognitive, and
behavioral attributes of a regime.311 ASEAN members seem to have
developed shared values, embraced common principles, formalized their
vision by incorporating it into binding instruments, engaged in serious
institution building, interacted intensively and productively (a process
featuring TLPT-style learning and socialization), joined together to a point
whereby their separate identities have become somewhat blurred, and gone
to considerable lengths to observe the rules that they have adopted; and
their efforts have not been in vain.312 This elaborate historical and analytical
exploration has solid liberal (a subtle appreciation of the benefits of
cooperation) and constructivist (a sense of group belonging)
underpinnings.313
None of the above assertions is in dispute. It is merely a matter of
proportions, or relative significance, and timing, or implementation lags
(whereby ambitious blueprints are distinctly slow in affecting ground-level
realities).314 As demonstrated here, the proverbial glass may be half-empty
or half-full, but it is clearly not overflowing.315 Indeed, the picture painted
in the institutionalist survey is a mixed one, in that the narrative is
interspersed with complementary realist/neo-realist insights.316 The long
lags between idea incubation and execution are also brought into focus
(e.g., two decades following is emergence, “the ASEAN haze regime
has . . . started to have effects on member [S]tates’ behaviors, particularly
in terms of the translation of regional policies into domestic systems

310. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 6–7 (“Even without a hegemon’s material
power, Indonesia still had insurmountable power in the negotiation for the haze treaty.”).
311. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 8–10 (recounting the characteristics of
regimes in regime theory and outlining ASEAN cooperation in this framework).
312. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 57–76, 123–44 (detailing the history of
Indonesian fires, the procedures established to regulate them, and the agreement’s
implementation as representative of the steps of regime formation).
313. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 97–98 (describing several factors affecting
regional cooperation and noting that economic interests militated against Indonesian
involvement in a binding cooperative scheme).
314. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 139–42 (advancing a collection of concerns
about implementation).
315. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 142 (“Although the regime has had some
effects on the state level, the ultimate objective of the regime is to solve the problem of land
and forest fires and its associated haze . . . [u]nfortunately, this goal has not yet been
achieved.”).
316. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 140 (discussing official concerns over
maintaining national sovereignty in light of the agreement’s intervention provisions).
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resulting from the ratification of the treaty, enactment of new laws and
regulations, and the creation of national plans”).317
Despite its longevity and progress, ASEAN is still often portrayed
as an organization which is capable of “big talk” but delivers “modest
actions”.318 It is noteworthy that a recent empirical study has found that the
level of trust between ASEAN States and societies, while not unimpressive,
given the organization’s humble origins, remains well below levels that
would be consistent with its avowed aim to transform itself soon into a
multi-dimensional and viable regional community.319 The interplay between
realist/neo-realist and liberal/constructivist forces is evident in the summary
offered by the institutionalist researcher who has painstakingly dissected
the regional governance system for the cross-border pollution:
The construction of an ASEAN haze regime is a result of a
complex rationality of the member [S]tates influenced by
both material and ideational factors at the domestic,
regional, and international levels. It is also an example par
excellence of a regional organization struggling to cope
with a complex unconventional threat in a globalized era.
Despite the contextual and structural constraints, the
regime has emerged and had an effect on member [S]tates,
particularly on the domestic political institutions. Besides,
it has also provided an arena whereby member [S]tates can
discuss, understand and learn how to cope with the issues
of common aversion.320
The summary incorporates additional competing/complementary elements
into the explanatory structure:
The construction of the haze regime is also a result of a
complex interplay of [the member States’] perceived
interest and ideas about the problem, the communicative
action and extensive negotiations at both the domestic and
regional levels. Other cross-cutting factors also impinged
317. NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 142.
318. Hiro Katsuma, The ASEAN Charter Controversy: Between Big Talk and Modest
Actions, in STRATEGIC CURRENTS: EMERGING TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 11, 11–14 (Yang
Razali Kassim ed., 2009).
319. See Christopher B. Roberts, The ASEAN Community: Trusting thy Neighbor, in
STRATEGIC CURRENTS: EMERGING TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 318, at 15, 15–20
(noting that regional interaction has not created adequate trust among nations, undermining
the notion of an ASEAN Community).
320. NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 152. For broadly similar insights regarding
developments on parallel fronts see Khong & Nesadurai, supra note 295, at 32–81
(analyzing the institutional design of the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN plus three
forum in the context of ASEAN’s realist culture of noninterference with domestic issues and
consensus decision-making).
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on the process of regime formation in various ways and at
different degrees. The regional politics and ASEAN
institutional norms or the ASEAN Way, such as the norm
of non-intervention, quiet diplomacy consultation and
consensus, shaped the way ASEAN leaders approached the
issues at different stages of regime formation. Domestic
politics including the political structures of ASEAN
members, insurgencies and even changes in domestic
leaderships affected the ability of each country to
concentrate in coping with the issue as well as the direction
in which they cooperate. Economic factors, namely the
economic crisis of 1997, closer economic ties within and
between Southeast Asia and other regions, and the
increasing demands of palm oil that is in part a result of the
diffusion of the environmental norms in other related issue
areas all had an impact on the regime formation process
and regime’s effectiveness in this case.321
This is an elaborate, balanced, and illuminating account. Realist/neo-realist
and institutionalist perspectives are brought to bear on an intricate
conceptual problem which may not be amenable to mono-causal
diagnosis.322 However, as is common in socio-legal work on governance
regimes, the effort yields a rich theoretical tapestry, but no structured
synthesis; the competing/complementary elements coexist side by side, yet
they do not coalesce.323 One of the important lessons of this survey is that
they may have to be combined into an organized analytical framework that
links them less unambiguously and more tightly together.
In light of the preceding discussion, it may be reasonable to suggest
that two forces, domestic political constellations/private interests and State
interests/leadership preferences, have been sufficiently potent to qualify as
exogenous/independent variables driving the system.324 Institutionalist
factors such as an appreciation of the benefits of cooperation and a sense of
group belonging should perhaps be accorded the status of
321. NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 152–53.
322. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 4 (“Indeed, what is needed is a larger
approach to examine the reality of cooperation, the processes influencing cooperation and
how this cooperation could contribute to problem solving.”).
323. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 145–53 (cataloging various disparate
perspectives on and aspects of the haze regime, including interest-based rationalist regime
theory, liberal accounts, cognitivist analysis, ideational factors, geography, and domestic
institutional design).
324. See DAVID W. BRITT, A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION TO MODELING: QUALITATIVE
AND QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVES 57–60 (1997) (describing exogenous variables as those
sources of influence that are never acted upon by other influences in a model).
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intervening/mediating variables that may reinforce or moderate the impact
of the key drivers.325 The impression is that they have generally
blunted/moderated the effects of the more parochial influences.326
The model is not necessarily universally valid. Rather, it may
reflect the unique characteristics of East Asian/Southeast Asian
regionalism.327 By the same token, the structure need not be stable. For
instance, leadership preferences may not be static but change due to
learning, whether exogenous (i.e., TLPT-style, or a product of socialization)
or endogenous (i.e., rationalist-type, whereby agents deliberately fine-tune
their preferences as they acquire new information) in nature.328 Feedback is
an integral part of social adaptation, routinely incorporated into nonrecursive models of human behavior,329 but it is seldom invoked in studies
addressing the evolution of governance regimes.330 The growing appeal of
institutionalist approaches is not a random event.331 Today’s ASEAN may
be meaningfully, albeit selectively, examined through liberal/constructivist
lens,332 whereas that was not the case in the more distant past.333 This is

325. See id. at 84–90 (advancing mediating variables as a method of showing the path
by which a cause produces an effect, and of modeling more complicated relationships that
include complementary or antagonistic mediating variables).
326. See Khong & Nesadurai, supra note 295, at 50–51 (describing how the need for
cooperation to maintain the viability of the ASEAN Free Trade Area led states to relax their
insistence on nonintervention policy within ASEAN).
327. See Shaun Breslin, Theorizing East Asian Regionalism(s): New Regionalism and
Asia’s Future, in ADVANCING EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM, supra note 79, at 26–51 (noting
that Asian regionalism tends to be less formally institutionalized, as are most other regional
organizations except the European Union, and influenced in important ways by nonstate
actors and state responses to global trade).
328. See HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 22, at 180 (contrasting conceptions of
policy learning as deliberate adjustments to past results or less conscious responses to
changes in the policy environment).
329. See BRITT, supra note 324, at 57–63, 94–110 (describing feedback effects in the
context of directionality, polarity, indirect effects, and unanticipated consequences as
modeling tools).
330. See BRITT, supra note 324, at 60 (noting that qualitative researchers are
“somewhat ambivalent” about feedback representations in research, preferring to use a
“richer vocabulary” to capture relationships).
331. See B. GUY PETERS, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 1, 14
(2000) (noting the renewed reliance on institutional theories in modern political science
scholarship, and describing the advantages of institutionalism for conceptualizing political
agents and predicting behavior).
332. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 97–98 (describing several factors affecting
regional cooperation and noting that economic interests militated against Indonesian
involvement in a binding cooperative scheme).
333. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 38 (describing realist pessimism about the
existence of an ASEAN community, and the confirming regional disunity resulting from
crises during the 1990s).
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another lesson that may be drawn by scrutinizing its performance in the
ecological domain.
VI. Conclusion
ASEAN consists of a small number of countries, most of which
lack substantial economic and military power.334 Even collectively, it
enjoys limited leverage as a player in the global arena.335 Nevertheless,
ASEAN is arguably the world’s second most vibrant and visible regional
grouping, after the EU.336 It has lofty aspirations which may not be fulfilled
entirely and soon, but it has traveled a long way since its establishment in
1967, both in the instrumental and psychological sense of the term.337 In an
international setting marked by a scarcity of truly successful regional
organizations, ASEAN merits scholarly attention in its own right and as a
manifestation of a broader phenomenon.
ASEAN has been primarily concerned with national security and
economic issues.338 However, socio-cultural questions have also loomed on
its agenda, and it has started to display an increasing awareness of the
inherent tension between a relentless pursuit of wealth maximization and
environmental preservation.339 Over time, ASEAN has undertaken various
initiatives that, in conjunction with other inputs, have propelled it to a level
whereby it can be said to possess an elaborate infrastructure for alleviating
ecological strains, including those stemming from cross-border
externalities.340

334. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 244–45 (describing ASEAN’s
substantial, but comparatively modest, stake as a regional actor).
335. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 239 (stating that cooperation is
needed to organize regional economic development and put Asia into a constructive position
on the world stage).
336. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 38 (comparing current and
projected GDP for an integrated Asia and the EU).
337. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 26–54 (chronicling the rise of
Asian regionalism).
338. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 38, at 256–57 (listing areas of focus
and major initiatives pursued by Asian regional groupings).
339. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 43–47 (contrasting the rise of sustainable
development as an ASEAN policy objective with the economic realities of resource
development).
340. See Clad & Siy, supra note 198, at 52–73 (noting the variety of ASEAN initiatives
on the books, the creation of state environmental ministries in response to regional pressure,
and the variety of domestic nongovernmental organizations and international groups
influencing environmental policy).
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While extensive, this system exhibits notable weaknesses as well as
strengths.341 Precisely for that reason, the ASEAN experience may be
explored from multiple perspectives and employed as a basis for assessing
their effectiveness.342 It is apparent that realist/neo-realist constructs should
not be consigned to oblivion.343 It is equally clear that they cannot provide
satisfactory explanations of environmental/international governance regime
dynamics without insights derived from other sources.344 Somehow, a way
needs to be found to integrate approaches that generate different images of
regional/international collaboration.
However, acknowledging the importance of a theoretical synthesis
is merely a first step in the process. ASEAN’s ecological history and its
efforts to tackle transboundary haze pollution inevitably produce many
divergent observations about the functioning of environmental/international
governance regimes.345 Identifying all the relevant influences, realist/neorealist and institutionalist alike, enriches understanding of a complex
phenomenon but does not ensure sufficient clarity.346 Socio-legal modelbuilding is incomplete unless relationships among variables are duly
specified within a context-sensitive and time-elastic framework.

341. See NARINE, supra note 51, at 170–72 (pointing out that despite the involvement
of environment ministers from throughout the region, the haze agreement was poorly
implemented due to partisan interests, weak regional institutions, and ASEAN’s tendency to
avoid domestic intervention).
342. See generally Macey & Colombatto, supra note 296, at 925–56 (providing a public
choice approach); NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 5–8 (providing a regime theory
approach).
343. See Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note 294, at 15–16 (discussing the importance of
realist constructs).
344. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 6 (“Because a hegemonic power is absent
from ASEAN cooperation on the haze, the realist assumptions based on power-configuration
are irrelevant in this study.”).
345. Compare Quah, supra note 287, at 429–41 (focusing on regulatory costs and
policy responses), with Jones, supra note 219, at 59–77 (focusing on design and impact of
the transboundary haze agreement).
346. See NGUITRAGOOL, supra note 39, at 145–53 (cataloging disparate perspectives on
and aspects of the haze regime).

